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Disclosure’s Effects: WikiLeaks and 
Transparency 
Mark Fenster 
ABSTRACT: Constitutional, criminal, and administrative laws regulating 
government transparency, and the theories that support them, rest on the 
assumption that the disclosure of information has transformative effects: 
disclosure can inform, enlighten, and energize the public, or it can create 
great harm and stymie government operations. To resolve disputes over 
difficult cases, transparency laws and theories typically balance disclosure’s 
beneficial effects against its harmful ones—what I have described as 
transparency’s balance. WikiLeaks and its vigilante approach to massive 
document leaks challenge the underlying assumption about disclosure’s 
effects in two ways. First, WikiLeaks’ ability to receive and distribute leaked 
information cheaply, quickly, and seemingly unstoppably enables it to 
bypass the legal framework that would otherwise allow courts and officials to 
consider and balance disclosure’s effects. For this reason, WikiLeaks 
threatens to make transparency’s balance irrelevant. Second, its recent 
massive disclosures of U.S. military and diplomatic documents allow us to 
reconsider and test the assumption that disclosure produces certain effects 
that can serve as the basis for judicial and administrative prediction, 
calculation, and balancing. For this reason, WikiLeaks threatens 
transparency’s balance by disproving its assumption that disclosure 
necessarily has predictable, identifiable consequences that can be estimated 
ex ante or even ex post. 
This Article studies WikiLeaks in order to test prevailing laws and theories 
of transparency that build on the assumption that disclosure’s effects are 
predictable, calculable, and capable of serving as the basis for adjudicating 
difficult cases. Tracing WikiLeaks’ development, operations, theories, and 
effects, it demonstrates the incoherence and conceptual poverty of an effects 
model for evaluating and understanding transparency. 
 
   UF Research Foundation Professor, Samuel T. Dell Research Scholar, Levin College of 
Law, University of Florida. Thanks for comments to Steven Aftergood, David Fontana, Lyrissa 
Lidsky, and Trysh Travis, and especially David Pozen. Thanks also to excellent, timely research 
assistance from Ariane Assadoghli and Stephen Bagge. This Article concerns a still-developing 
story and fast-evolving institution as it existed in December 2011 and will not reflect 
developments that occurred after that date. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The disclosure of government information must surely make a 
difference. Myriad laws1 and a large international community of 
transparency advocates2 presume so, as does most academic commentary on 
the subject.3 Consider the following description of transparency’s promise: 
“Publishing [leaked material] improves transparency, and this transparency 
creates a better society for all people. Better scrutiny leads to reduced 
corruption and stronger democracies in all society’s institutions, including 
government, corporations and other organisations. A healthy, vibrant and 
inquisitive journalistic media plays a vital role in achieving these goals.”4 
This declaration appears on the About page of WikiLeaks, the website 
whose project of leaking secret documents has recently brought it 
international fame and notoriety. Asserting that it is “part of that media” 
that spreads transparency, WikiLeaks contends that its publication of 
authentic documents leaked from governments and powerful private entities 
will expose “otherwise unaccountable and secretive institutions” that engage 
in unethical acts, and thereby help establish “good government and a 
 
 1. See, e.g., Common Cause v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 674 F.2d 921, 928 (D.C. Cir. 
1982) (explaining that Congress’s intent in enacting the Government in the Sunshine Act, 5 
U.S.C. § 552b (2006), requiring open agency meetings, was to “enhance citizen confidence in 
government, encourage higher quality work by government officials, stimulate well-informed 
public debate about government programs and policies, and promote cooperation between 
citizens and government. In short, it sought to make government more fully accountable to the 
people”); H.R. REP. NO. 89-1497, at 12 (1966), reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2418, 2429 
(stating that the legislative purpose for enacting the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. 
§ 552, was that “[a] democratic society requires an informed, intelligent electorate, and the 
intelligence of the electorate varies as the quantity and quality of its information varies”). 
 2. See ALASDAIR ROBERTS, BLACKED OUT 107–11 (2006). 
 3. Some advocates make this claim in a direct and straightforward manner, asserting that 
disclosure produces public knowledge. See, e.g., GEOFFREY R. STONE, TOP SECRET 2 (2007) 
(asserting that public disclosure alerts the public to poor government performance and allows 
citizens to press officials to remedy the situation); Cass R. Sunstein, Government Control of 
Information, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 889, 920–21 (1986) (summarizing competing First Amendment 
theories of disclosure and finding that all of them assume that access to information necessarily 
allows public deliberation and self-government). More sophisticated treatments of the concept 
characterize the process in terms of access and potential. See, e.g., Peter Dennis Bathory & 
Wilson Carey McWilliams, Political Theory and the People’s Right To Know, in GOVERNMENT SECRECY 
IN DEMOCRACIES 3, 8 (Itzhak Galnoor ed., 1977) (arguing that the “people’s right to know” 
demands public access to “those facts necessary for public judgment about public things” and 
allows “the greatest possible opportunity [for the public] to learn and master the art of political 
judgment” (emphasis omitted)); Ann Florini, Introduction: The Battle over Transparency, in THE 
RIGHT TO KNOW 1, 5 (Ann Florini ed., 2007) (defining transparency as “the degree to which 
information is available to outsiders that enables them to have informed voice in decisions 
and/or to assess the decisions made by insiders”). In both approaches, information and its 
content either guarantee or necessarily allow for public enlightenment, knowledge, and 
action—all of which are likely to occur, or else the enterprise would be unnecessary. 
 4. About WikiLeaks, WIKILEAKS, http://wikileaks.org/About.html# (last visited Dec. 24, 
2011). 
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healthy society,” “alter the course of history in the present, and . . . lead us to 
a better future.”5 This sequential narrative, in which information disclosure 
leads to a more engaged public, more democratic politics, and a more 
efficient state, forms a core tenet of the transparency ideal. Information 
transforms; therefore, it must be disclosed. 
A similar narrative plays the same role in concerns about the 
unauthorized disclosure of classified information. The laws and regulations 
that govern classification assume the state knows—or at least can confidently 
predict—disclosure’s ill effects. The classification system, for example, is 
premised upon anticipating risk by sorting documents into the categories of 
“confidential,” “secret,” or “top secret,” based on the conclusion that the 
information these documents contain “reasonably could be expected to 
cause,” respectively, “damage,” “serious damage,” or “exceptionally grave 
damage” to national security.6 The Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) 
explicitly exempts properly classified information from disclosure, 
protecting any document properly classified from release in response to a 
public request.7 The Espionage Act criminalizes, among other things, 
classified information’s unauthorized disclosure, again by presuming that 
authorized officials have reasonably anticipated disclosure’s danger in 
classifying documents.8 Constitutional executive-privilege and state-secret 
doctrines rest on the parallel presumption that the threat of disclosure will 
affect the executive’s ability to protect the nation and perform his delegated 
duties.9 This sequential narrative, in which information disclosure impairs 
the state’s operations and endangers the nation, forms a core tenet of the 
transparency ideal’s limitations.10 Information transforms; therefore, it must 
be controlled. 
 
 5. Id. 
 6. Exec. Order No. 13,526, 3 C.F.R. 298, § 1.2(a)(1)–(3) (2010), available at http:// 
www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CFR-2010-title3-vol1/pdf/CFR-2010-title3-vol1-eo13526.pdf. 
 7. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1) (2006). 
 8. See 18 U.S.C. § 793(d)–(e) (2006) (defining classified national security information 
subject to the act as “any document, writing, code book, signal book, sketch, photograph, 
photographic negative, blueprint, plan, map, model, instrument, appliance, or note relating to 
the national defense, or information relating to the national defense”); see also infra notes 161–
63 and accompanying text. 
 9. See, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 705 (1974) (recognizing the executive-
privilege doctrine for internal communications on the grounds that “[h]uman experience 
teaches that those who expect public dissemination of their remarks may well temper candor 
with a concern for appearances and for their own interests to the detriment of the 
decisionmaking process”); United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 10 (1953) (establishing the 
state-secrets doctrine for cases in which the government can show “there is a reasonable danger 
that compulsion of the evidence will expose military matters which, in the interest of national 
security, should not be divulged”). 
 10. See GABRIEL SCHOENFELD, NECESSARY SECRETS: NATIONAL SECURITY, THE MEDIA, AND 
THE RULE OF LAW 21 (2010) (arguing that keeping information from the public is essential for 
government deliberation and national self-preservation). 
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Faith in information’s transformative power thus sustains efforts both to 
reveal and to control government information. It demands that both 
democratic theory and contemporary laws of transparency recognize a 
presumption of disclosure. It also demands exceptions from disclosure that 
allow for greater state control in certain circumstances. 
This Article argues that such assumptions about information’s essential, 
predictable effects rely on a mistaken understanding of what is a 
complicated administrative, political, and communicative process. 
Government information frequently has no obvious meaning. Its 
significance often creates significant political and social contest. It is 
sometimes misinterpreted; it is often ignored by all but a small minority of 
interested groups and individuals. There is no guarantee that a government 
document or meeting, when made public, will enlighten the public that sees 
it. And the reverse is equally true—there is no guarantee that government 
secrecy shuts down the flow of information or even conceals knowledge 
about government action. Nor is there any guarantee that disclosure will 
endanger the nation or adversely affect the government’s ability to 
deliberate or operate. In a complex democratic state and civil society, 
secrecy and disclosure rarely exist in pure forms, and they seldom have 
diametrically opposed effects. Information-disclosure law and the theory that 
supports it rely upon the ability to predict and ascertain disclosure’s effects. 
But if we cannot predict them in advance, how can we hypothesize about—
much less base laws upon—disclosure’s benefits and risks? 
This Article uses the recent events and controversies surrounding 
WikiLeaks to question the meaning and effects of the suppression and 
disclosure of government information. Doing so makes plain the frequently 
unexamined and undertheorized complexity of disclosure’s effects. 
WikiLeaks promises to allow its readers access to “evidence of the truth,”11 
and to that end has released largely unredacted, classified documents that 
would not have been released for years or decades—if they were released at 
all. It did so without the typical delays that attend public requests or 
declassification processes. Although it is of course far too soon to evaluate 
the full effects of WikiLeaks’ disclosures, it is possible to sketch out how this 
episode illustrates the conceptual poverty of prevailing legal doctrines and 
theories of transparency. WikiLeaks demonstrates that disclosure’s effects 
are in fact unpredictable and contingent upon existing political, legal, and 
social conditions in the political units and among the publics affected by 
disclosures. 
The Article begins in Part I with a brief narrative of WikiLeaks and its 
emergence as an agent of and model for a radical form of transparency. Part 
II then describes and analyzes the theories of transparency and disclosure 
that WikiLeaks’ public leader, Julian Assange, has articulated to explain and 
 
 11. About WikiLeaks, supra note 4. 
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justify the project. Part III places WikiLeaks’ project in the broader context 
of existing open-government laws and theories of transparency as well as in 
the specific legal context in which WikiLeaks may be prosecuted. The 
prevailing law requires courts to weigh disclosure’s dangerous effects 
alongside its benefits. The Article then sketches what we know or can 
ascertain thus far of WikiLeaks’ uneven and unpredictable short-term 
effects—effects that are relatively insubstantial in the U.S., at least according 
to available open-source materials, but arguably more significant elsewhere. 
I.  WIKILEAKS’ DISCLOSURES 
WikiLeaks’ 2010–11 release of multiple large caches of classified 
documents stolen from the U.S. government constitutes the most radical 
form of unauthorized disclosure since the leak of the Pentagon Papers forty 
years ago.12 Its model of anonymously provided, unedited or barely edited 
documents promises its readers complete transparency in unexpurgated 
form, made available via a self-proclaimed “scientific journalism” that grants 
the public full access to the state’s internal workings.13 The site’s most 
prominent figure, Julian Assange, has offered in his writings and interviews a 
well-articulated—if somewhat conflicted—theory of political information 
and power, which asserts that disclosure can both create an enlightened 
public and discipline those corrupt and authoritarian state actors whose 
nefarious ways depend upon their ability to keep their activities secret.14 To 
a proponent like Daniel Ellsberg (of Pentagon Papers fame), WikiLeaks “is 
serving our democracy and serving our rule of law precisely by challenging 
 
 12. As of this writing, for the most comprehensive account of the legal and institutional 
implications of WikiLeaks’ history and operations, see Yochai Benkler, A Free Irresponsible Press: 
Wikileaks and the Battle over the Soul of the Networked Fourth Estate, 46 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 311 
(2011). For other sources, see DAVID LEIGH & LUKE HARDING, WIKILEAKS: INSIDE JULIAN 
ASSANGE’S WAR ON SECRECY (2011); GREG MITCHELL, THE AGE OF WIKILEAKS: FROM 
COLLATERAL MURDER TO CABLEGATE (AND BEYOND) (2011); MICAH L. SIFRY, WIKILEAKS AND 
THE AGE OF TRANSPARENCY (2011); Alasdair S. Roberts, WikiLeaks: The Illusion of Transparency 
(Suffolk Univ. Law Sch. Research Paper No. 11-19, 2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/ 
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1801343; mollysauter, Wikileaks FAQ, FUTUREOFTHEINTERNET.ORG 
(Dec. 7, 2010), http://futureoftheinternet.org/wikileaks-cable-faq; and WikiLeaks, WIKIPEDIA, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/WikiLeaks (last visited Dec. 24, 2011). For an excellent resource 
for information about Assange and about the development of WikiLeaks, see Robert Manne, 
Essay, The Cypherpunk Revolutionary: Julian Assange, MONTHLY (Austl.), Mar. 2011, at 17. An 
abridged version of this essay is available at http://www.themonthly.com.au/julian-assange-
cypherpunk-revolutionary-robert-manne-3081; see also http://cryptome.org/0003/assange-
manne.htm. A memoir by a disgruntled former member of the WikiLeaks collective is also 
informative, though the author’s close, fraught, and now embittered relationship with Assange 
renders it less than authoritative. See DANIEL DOMSCHEIT-BERG, INSIDE WIKILEAKS (Jefferson 
Chase trans., Crown Pubs. 2011). On the Pentagon Papers, see DANIEL ELLSBERG, SECRETS 
(2002); DAVID RUDENSTINE, THE DAY THE PRESSES STOPPED: A HISTORY OF THE PENTAGON 
PAPERS CASE 33–47 (1996). 
 13. See infra text accompanying notes 86–89. 
 14. See infra Part II.B. 
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the secrecy regulations, which are not laws in most cases, in this country”;15 
to Yochai Benkler, the site represents the emerging “networked fourth 
estate” that fundamentally challenges incumbent media institutions16 and 
that “mark[s] the emergence of a new decentralized, global, and networked 
model of the watchdog function.”17 It also plays a prominent role in what 
one commentator has termed the “Age of Transparency”: an era of 
networked communication in which social media and so-called crowd-
sourced information are inexorably changing the shape of the government 
and its relationship to its citizens.18 The WikiLeaks story, in this account, is 
one in which the site’s disclosures will necessarily change what the state does 
and how it performs. To its most vociferous critics, however, WikiLeaks 
constitutes a dangerous, illegal disruption to state security and operations 
that must be stopped by any means possible.19 The WikiLeaks narrative, in 
sum, presents a struggle over the promise and limits of transparency and 
disclosure’s presumed effects. 
WikiLeaks was created in late 2006 by what was then described as an 
anonymous “team” of open-source computer engineers (i.e., hackers) and 
political activists who sought to expose corrupt and oppressive regimes 
throughout the world.20 Prior to its most famous (at least to American and 
Western European politics) releases, which began in mid-2010, WikiLeaks 
had gained international attention by posting a mix of raw documents 
concerning diverse newsworthy public figures and governments in the 
United States, Africa, and Western Europe.21 In all of these releases, one or 
 
 15. John Nichols, Dan Ellsberg on WikiLeaks & the Essential Democratic Question: Who Will Tell 
the People?, NATION (July 26, 2010, 7:19 PM), http://www.thenation.com/blog/37949/dan-
ellsberg-wikileaks-essential-democratic-question-who-will-tell-people (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 16. Benkler, supra note 12, at 311–12. 
 17. Yochai Benkler, The Real Significance of WikiLeaks, AM. PROSPECT, June 2011, at 31, 33, 
available at http://prospect.org/article/real-significance-wikileaks (book review). 
 18. SIFRY, supra note 12, at 137–68; see also Clay Shirky, WikiLeaks and the Long Haul, CLAY 
SHIRKY (Dec. 6, 2010, 12:03 PM), http://www.shirky.com/weblog/2010/12/wikileaks-and-the-
long-haul/ (praising WikiLeaks for allowing citizens to know what the state is doing and thereby 
creating “the democracy of citizens distrusting rather than legitimizing the actions of the 
state”). 
 19. See Benkler, supra note 12, at 331–33 (summarizing what he characterizes as the 
“political attack” on WikiLeaks). 
 20. Paul Marks, How To Leak a Secret and Not Get Caught, NEW SCIENTIST, Jan. 13, 2007, at 
26, 26. The precise origins of the site’s initial cache of documents are contested, according to a 
prominent blog. See Kim Zetter, WikiLeaks Was Launched with Documents Intercepted from Tor, 
THREAT LEVEL (June 1, 2010, 4:28 PM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2010/06/ 
wikileaks-documents. An important predecessor to WikiLeaks as an anonymous host for leaked 
documents is Cryptome, whose founder, Paul Young, served briefly on the WikiLeaks advisory 
board. See Declan McCullagh, WikiLeaks’ Estranged Co-Founder Becomes a Critic (Q&A), CNET 
NEWS (July 20, 2010, 1:40 PM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-31921_3-20011106-281.html. 
 21. See LEIGH & HARDING, supra note 12, at 57–64 (describing WikiLeaks’ early releases). 
Among other things, these document caches exposed political corruption and violence in 
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more sources who obtained apparently authentic documents (through legal 
or other means) sent the digital files to WikiLeaks. The organization then 
globally distributed the electronic files—without, it has claimed, filtering or 
editing the documents.22 The site’s increasing notoriety, along with its 
zealous protection of its sources’ identities,23 has given it worldwide 
prominence as a preeminent channel for whistle-blowers.24 WikiLeaks 
thereby established a powerful brand identity as a technologically 
sophisticated service capable of distributing purloined data anonymously 
and publicizing its release. Its success has in turn inspired other similar sites 
to open, all patterned on the WikiLeaks model.25 
 
Kenya and other African political and environmental scandals; operations manuals of the 
Guantanamo Bay detention camp; secret manuals from the Church of Scientology; and self-
dealing by the owners of Kaupthing Bank, the bank whose collapse hastened Iceland’s financial 
downfall. See Manfred Goetzke, WikiLeaks Website Offers Promising Outlet for Fighting Corruption, 
DEUTSCHE WELLE (Nov. 26, 2009), http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,4930880,00.html; 
Andy Greenberg, WikiLeaks’ Julian Assange Wants To Spill Your Corporate Secrets, FORBES (Nov. 29, 
2010, 5:04 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/andygreenberg/2010/11/29/wikileaks-julian-
assange-wants-to-spill-your-corporate-secrets/. 
 22. About WikiLeaks, supra note 4. 
 23. For a nonspecialist’s description of the technological backbone of WikiLeaks’ 
capabilities of protecting the anonymity of its sources and of protecting itself from censorship, 
see LEIGH & HARDING, supra note 12, at 55–56. 
 24. See Joby Warrick, WikiLeaks Works To Expose Government Secrets, but Web Site’s Sources Are a 
Mystery, WASH. POST (May 19, 2010), www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/ 
05/19/AR2010051905333.html. 
 25. A disgruntled former WikiLeaks member, Daniel Domscheit-Berg, has launched 
another rival site, while the New York Times, WikiLeaks’ U.S. journalistic collaborator (with 
whom it has a stormy relationship), may establish a competing site that would allow whistle-
blowers to anonymously pass documents to the newspaper. See Michael Calderone, NY Times 
Considers Creating an “EZ Pass Lane for Leakers,” YAHOO! NEWS (Jan. 25, 2011), http://news. 
yahoo.com/blogs/cutline/ny-times-considers-creating-ez-pass-lane-leakers-20110125-053811-98 
8.html; Frank Jordans, Openleaks, WikiLeaks Rival, Launches New Secret-Spilling Site, HUFFINGTON 
POST (Jan. 28, 2011, 10:31 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/01/28/ 
openleaks-wikileaks-rival_0_n_815309.html; A Swarm of Leaks: WikiLeaks’ Rivals Will Be Hard To 
Fight, ECONOMIST (Dec. 9, 2010), http://www.economist.com/node/17674089?story_id= 
17674089. WikiLeaks also inspired the Palestine Papers, hosted by the commercial Al Jazeera 
network, which leaked a large cache of recent documents relating to the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict. See FAQ: The Palestine Papers, AL JAZEERA, http://www.aljazeera.com/palestinepapers/ 
2011/01/2011123114726552723.html (last modified Jan. 23, 2011). The Wall Street Journal’s 
announcement of its own leaking site, SafeHouse, https://www.wsjsafehouse.com/, was roundly 
dismissed for alleged weaknesses in the technical and legal protection it would offer to any 
would-be leakers. See Josh Halliday, Wall Street Journal Faces Backlash over WikiLeaks Rival, 
GUARDIAN (May 6, 2011, 09:21 EDT), http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/2011/may/06/wall-
street-journal-wikileaks-safehouse; Paul Marks, Absurd Rules Make WSJ’s New Leak Site a Non-
Starter, ONE PER CENT (May 6, 2011, 13:44), http://www.newscientist.com/blogs/onepercent/ 
2011/05/phone-hacking-publishers-leak.html. For a compelling discussion of the possibilities 
and limits of WikiLeaks as a model, see Geert Lovink & Patrice Riemens, Twelve Theses on 
WikiLeaks, EUROZINE (Dec. 7, 2010), http://www.eurozine.com/articles/2010-12-07-
lovinkriemens-en.html. 
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Julian Assange, much of whose earlier life had been spent as a 
prominent hacker and participant in the so-called cypherpunk community, 
orchestrated and oversaw the site’s creation.26 It exists only as an ephemeral 
noncommercial venture, thereby distinguishing itself from traditional place-
based journalistic authorities that operate either commercially, under state 
ownership, or with state subsidies. It also prizes and attempts to keep secret 
details about its internal operations and management.27 Its absence of 
physical grounding extends to its operations: it is not “housed” anywhere but 
in servers in multiple countries, and it makes its content available via 
hundreds of domain names.28 It represents itself as an institution without a 
home, a populist news medium for an online world. Hence, its name and 
brand: Wiki conjoined with Leaks.29 
As WikiLeaks reached the current peak of its influence and celebrity in 
2010, Assange emerged as the previously anonymous site’s spokesperson 
and leader, and quickly came to embody WikiLeaks.30 He gave it at least the 
 
 26. See Manne, supra note 12, at 21–31; Hans Ulrich Obrist, In Conversation with Julian 
Assange, Part I, E-FLUX (May 2011), www.e-flux.com/journal/view/232. 
 27. At least at one time, WikiLeaks required its staff to sign a confidentiality agreement 
recognizing that all information that staff is exposed to, including the existence of the 
agreement itself, belongs to WikiLeaks, and a staff member’s significant breach would be 
subject not only to an injunction to prevent disclosure but would also cause damages to the 
organization “in the region of £12,000,000.” WikiLeaks ITC, Ltd., Confidentiality Agreement, 
available at http://images.newstatesman.com/wikileaks.pdf. Compare David Allen Green, The 
£12m Question: How WikiLeaks Gags Its Own Staff, NEW STATESMAN (May 11, 2011, 3:31 PM), 
http://www.newstatesman.com/blogs/david-allen-green/2011/05/wikileaks-information-legal 
(criticizing the confidentiality agreement as “draconian and extraordinary”), with Kevin 
Gosztola, 2011-05-12 Leaked WikiLeaks Confidentiality Agreement: Neither “Draconian” Nor 
“Extraordinary,” WL CENT. (May 12, 2011, 13:08), http://wlcentral.org/node/1763 (defending 
the agreement). The agreement was leaked by James Ball, who had worked for WikiLeaks and 
had refused to sign the agreement, characterizing it as “by orders of magnitude the most 
restrictive I have ever encountered” in the media industry. James Ball, WikiLeaks, Get Out of the 
Gagging Game, GUARDIAN (May 12, 2011, 12:43 EDT), http://www.guardian.co.uk/ 
commentisfree/2011/may/12/wikileaks-confidentiality-agreement-julian-assange. 
 28. Raffi Khatchadourian, No Secrets: Julian Assange’s Mission for Total Transparency, NEW 
YORKER, June 7, 2010, at 40, 40; see also Jay Rosen, The Afghanistan War Logs Released by 
WikiLeaks, the World’s First Stateless News Organization, PRESSTHINK (July 26, 2010, 1:31 AM), 
http://pressthink.org/2010/07/the-afghanistan-war-logs-released-by-wikileaks-the-worlds-first-
stateless-news-organization/. Assange’s British attorney has characterized the site’s statelessness 
as, in part, a legal strategy to limit its susceptibility to the laws of individual states. See Emily 
Badger, WikiLeaks and the Future of Whistle-Blowing, MILLER-MCCUNE (May 2, 2011), http://www. 
miller-mccune.com/media/wikileaks-and-the-future-of-whistle-blowing-30795/. 
 29. See LEIGH & HARDING, supra note 12, at 52 (describing derivation of the WikiLeaks 
name and its relationship to Wikipedia). The decision to use Wiki as a prefix in the site’s name 
seems in hindsight a mistake, given Assange’s later criticism of crowd-sourcing for journalism. 
See infra text accompanying note 120. It seems best to understand the prefix now as signifying 
the demand-side prominence of Wikipedia as a freely available, collectively produced, 
antiauthoritarian source for the people. 
 30. Assange explains that his identity and role were revealed by others when journalists 
began to investigate WikiLeaks’ inner workings. See Hans Ulrich Obrist, In Conversation with 
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potential for a material grounding in a legal and jurisdictional sense.31 Like 
the site, Assange seems to have no permanent national residence, and in 
mid-2010, he claimed to feel secure only in four “different bases in different 
places” where his project has strong political support.32 His criminal 
indictment in late 2010 in Sweden for rape has both complicated his 
jurisdictional association and defined him even further as a nearly stateless 
person, an Australian national without a permanent address.33 But his 
existence as an individual figure subject to identification and prosecution—
indeed, his omnipresence in news conferences, television interviews, and 
dead-tree media reportage—transfigured WikiLeaks’ public image as a semi-
anonymous hacker collective34 into that of a more traditional organization 
and website.  
WikiLeaks’ most celebrated U.S. military- and diplomatic-document 
releases from U.S. government sources began in April 2010 with the 
uploading of a video (which it titled Collateral Murder) showing a lethal 2007 
U.S. Army Apache helicopter attack on a group of men in Baghdad.35 The 
video was allegedly part of a large cache of digital files the site had received 
from Bradley Manning, a young army intelligence officer with the rank of 
private first class who leveraged his level of security clearance and access to 
two classified databases to download data from a military server.36 More 
traditional documentary releases followed: in July 2010, tens of thousands of 
 
Julian Assange, Part II, E-FLUX (June 2011), http://www.e-flux.com/journal/in-conversation-
with-julian-assange-part-ii/. 
 31. On Assange, see especially Manne, supra note 12, as well as John F. Burns & Ravi 
Somaiya, WikiLeaks Founder on the Run, Trailed by Notoriety, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 23, 2010), http:// 
www.nytimes.com/2010/10/24/world/24assange.html?ref=wikileaks; see also Eben Harrell, 
Defending the Leaks: Q&A with WikiLeaks’ Julian Assange, TIME (July 27, 2010), http://www.time. 
com/time/world/article/0,8599,2006789,00.html; David Kushner, Cloak and Dagger: Inside 
WikiLeaks’ Leak Factory, MOTHER JONES (June 2, 2010), http://motherjones.com/politics/ 
2010/07/click-and-dagger-wikileaks-julian-assange-iraq-video-updated; Khatchadourian, supra 
note 28. 
 32. Harrell, supra note 31; see also Obrist, supra note 30. 
 33. On the rape charge, efforts by Swedish authorities to extradite Assange from England, 
and the effects of Assange’s prosecution on WikiLeaks, see LEIGH & HARDING, supra note 12, at 
145–63, 227–39; Benkler, supra note 12, at 345–47. 
 34. There are widely accepted rumors that at least some of WikiLeaks’ early disclosures 
were based on data that it had hacked from the Tor network. See LEIGH & HARDING, supra note 
12, at 53–56. 
 35. See WikiLeaks, Collateral Murder, COLLATERAL MURDER (Apr. 5, 2010), 
http://collateralmurder.com/ (also available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3ALAZdsgu 
O8&feature=dir). A full account of the Collateral Murder video and its production appears in 
Khatchadourian, supra note 28, at 43–45, 49–51. 
 36. See Alex Altman, Afghan Leaks: Is the U.S. Keeping Too Many Secrets?, TIME (July 30, 
2010), http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,2007224,00.html; Ginger Thompson, 
Early Struggles of Soldier Charged in Leak Case, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 8, 2010), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/09/us/09manning.html?scp=1&sq=Early%20Struggles%20of
%20Soldier%20Charged%20in%20Leak%20Case&st=cse; see also LEIGH & HARDING, supra note 
12, at 72–89; MITCHELL, supra note 12, at 38–50. 
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classified documents from the war in Afghanistan;37 in late October 2010, 
hundreds of thousands of documents about the Iraq war;38 from late 
November 2010 through early 2011, diplomatic cables between the U.S. 
State Department and its diplomatic missions around the world;39 and in 
April 2011, files concerning detainees held as suspected terrorists at the 
Guantanamo Bay military prison.40 In September 2011, all of the State 
Department cables were made publicly available in unredacted form after 
reporters for the Guardian newspaper inadvertently disclosed the encryption 
key for the files, copies of which were accessible on the Internet.41 Many of 
the documents, but by no means all, were classified, and none was classified 
above “secret.”42 Nevertheless, these documents were unavailable to the 
public, and likely would have remained so for years—if not forever.43 After 
granting preview access to major Western newspapers that independently 
reviewed and reported on the documents, WikiLeaks posted the raw 
documentary sources—with minimal redactions to protect the anonymity of 
 
 37. See LEIGH & HARDING, supra note 12, at 116–27; Benkler, supra note 12, at 323–24. 
 38. See LEIGH & HARDING, supra note 12, at 128–34; Benkler, supra note 12, at 325–26. 
 39. See LEIGH & HARDING, supra note 12, at 135–44; Benkler, supra note 12, at 326–30. 
 40. Tom Lasseter, Guantanamo Secret Files Show U.S. Often Held Innocent Afghans, 
MCCLATCHY (Apr. 26, 2011), http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2011/04/26/112854/guantanamo-
secret-files-show-us.html#ixzz1QUV5GJCn; Charlie Savage et al., Classified Files Offer New Insights 
Into Detainees, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 24, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/25/world/ 
guantanamo-files-lives-in-an-american-limbo.html. 
 41. See Paul Marks, Assange: Why WikiLeaks Was Right To Release Raw Cables, NEW SCIENTIST 
(Sept. 6, 2011), http://www.newscientist.com/article/dn20869-assange-why-wikileaks-was-right-
to-release-raw-cables.html; Raphael G. Satter, WikiLeaks Reveals All, Media Groups Criticize Move, 
YAHOO! NEWS (Sept. 2, 2011), http://news.yahoo.com/wikileaks-reveals-media-groups-criticize-
move-144202957.html; Christian Stöcker, A Dispatch Disaster in Six Acts, SPIEGEL ONLINE (Sept. 
1, 2011), http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,783778,00.html. 
 42. Most of the documents that composed the Afghanistan and Iraq “War Logs” were 
classified “secret.” A Note to Readers, Piecing Together the Reports, and Deciding What To Publish, 
N.Y. TIMES (July 25, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/26/world/26editors-note.html; 
Scott Stewart, WikiLeaks and the Culture of Classification, STRATFOR (Oct. 28, 2010), 
http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20101027_wikileaks_and_culture_classification. Of the more 
than 250,000 diplomatic cables WikiLeaks obtained, approximately 11,000 were classified 
“secret,” 4,000 were classified “secret” and “noforn” (that is, not to be shared with a foreign 
government), and 9,000 were classified “noforn.” Scott Shane & Andrew W. Lehren, Leaked 
Cables Offer Raw Look at U.S. Diplomacy, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 28, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2010/11/29/world/29cables.html; see also What Do the Diplomatic Cables Really Tell Us?, SPIEGEL 
ONLINE (Nov. 28, 2010), http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,731441,00.html 
(giving slightly different figures from the New York Times). 
 43. See Daniel W. Drezner, Why WikiLeaks Is Bad for Scholars, CHRON. HIGHER ED. (Dec. 5, 
2010), http://chronicle.com/article/Why-WikiLeaks-Is-Bad-for/125628/ (characterizing the 
diplomatic cables as documents that would have been unavailable to academics for decades); 
Dan Murphy, WikiLeaks Releases Video Depicting US Forces Killing of Two Reuters Journalists in Iraq, 
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Apr. 5, 2010), http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Global-News/2010/ 
0405/Wikileaks-releases-video-depicting-US-forces-killing-of-two-Reuters-journalists-in-Iraq (noting 
that the Collateral Murder video showed an attack about which Reuters had unsuccessfully sought 
information through the Freedom of Information Act). 
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sources and other individuals who might face reprisal if their identities were 
revealed—on its site simultaneously with the newspapers’ reports.44 The so-
called “War Logs” from Iraq and Afghanistan generally revealed 
unflattering, and at times damning, information about the conduct of the 
American military during two wars, including evidence of civilian deaths, 
abuse, and torture by local militias friendly to the United States, military 
reliance on private contractors, and the difficulty that American forces faced 
both on the ground and in managing complex internal and international 
political alliances (for example, with Pakistan in Afghanistan).45 The 
diplomatic cables revealed a broad range of information about how U.S. 
diplomats viewed foreign leaders and the political and economic conditions 
in countries and regions around the world.46 The Guantanamo files revealed 
that many of the detainees held as terrorists were low-risk, and some of the 
intelligence relied on in capturing and holding them was flawed.47 
U.S. government agencies have responded to rumors that WikiLeaks is 
about to release potentially damaging documents by scrambling to identify a 
 
 44. See LEIGH & HARDING, supra note 12, at 110–15 (describing the negotiated agreements 
between WikiLeaks and its newspaper partners to redact documents); Benkler, supra note 12, at 
321–30 (summarizing the WikiLeaks releases and describing the site’s relationship with the 
established print news media). WikiLeaks offered prerelease access to the “War Logs” 
documents to four news organizations: the New York Times, the Guardian (U.K.), Le Monde 
(France), and Der Spiegel (Germany). The Times’ coverage appears at http://www.nytimes.com/ 
interactive/world/war-logs.html, and the Guardian’s at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/iraq-
war-logs and http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/the-war-logs. For an inside account of the 
relationship between WikiLeaks and one of the newspapers to whom it granted preview access, 
written from one of the newspapers’ perspectives, see Sarah Ellison, The Man Who Spilled the 
Secrets, VANITY FAIR (Feb. 2011), http://www.vanityfair.com/politics/features/2011/02/the-
guardian-201102 (based on interviews with editors from the Guardian); Bill Keller, Dealing with 
Julian Assange and the WikiLeaks Secrets, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 26, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2011/01/30/magazine/30Wikileaks-t.html?scp=2&sq=%22the%20boy%20who%20kicked%20th 
e%20hornet’s%20nest%22&st=cse (chronicling a New York Times editor’s account); see also 
Javier Moreno, Why El País Chose To Publish the Leaks, EL PAÍS.COM (Dec. 23, 2010), 
http://www.elpais.com/articulo/english/Why/PAIS/chose/to/publish/the/leaks/elpepueng/2
0101223elpeng_3/Ten (describing Spanish newspaper’s later role in working with WikiLeaks). 
By March 2011, WikiLeaks had relationships with “89 media organizations” in fifty countries. 
See Global—Media Currently Publishing, WIKILEAKS, http://wikileaks.ch/Media-Currently-
Publishing.html (last visited Dec. 24, 2011). 
 45. The New York Times packaged the highlights of its reporting based on the “War Logs” 
in OPEN SECRETS: WIKILEAKS, WAR, AND AMERICAN DIPLOMACY 252–328 (Alexander Star ed., 
2011) [hereinafter OPEN SECRETS]; see also LEIGH & HARDING, supra note 12, at 116–34 
(providing the Guardian’s perspective on the “War Logs”). 
 46. LEIGH & HARDING, supra note 12, at 135–44; OPEN SECRETS, supra note 45, at 62–203. 
The State Department releases continued long after the initial wave of disclosures by the major 
newspapers. WikiLeaks continued to release thousands of documents relating to U.S. relations 
with other nations, frequently through news outlets in those countries. See Joshua E. Keating, 
The WikiLeaks You Missed, FOREIGN POL’Y (July 1, 2011), http://www.foreignpolicy.com/ 
articles/2011/01/01/the_wikileaks_you_missed (describing releases about Thailand, Haiti, 
India, Pakistan, and other nations). 
 47. See Lasseter, supra note 40; Savage et al., supra note 40. 
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means to prevent the release or mitigate the expected damage.48 But they 
have found no simple solution.49 In the wake of the first release of 
Afghanistan war documents, the Department of Justice considered filing 
criminal indictments against the WikiLeaks principals for, among other 
charges, encouraging their sources to steal government property and 
classified information.50 Establishing that those who attempt to disclose 
stolen classified documents will face criminal punishment could not only 
shut down WikiLeaks but also deter others’ efforts to open new, similar 
sites.51 A legal solution may not be an effective or attractive one, however. 
Assange is not a U.S. citizen, which does not necessarily make him immune 
from prosecution.52 However, because he has traveled only occasionally to 
the United States (and is even less likely to do so of his own volition now), 
his arrest will depend upon the U.S. government’s ability to have him 
extradited.53 Moreover, as the Pentagon Papers episode demonstrated, a 
state that punishes a whistle-blower and the media that circulates purloined 
documents only assists the whistle-blower and his cause by escalating the 
 
 48. Tony Capaccio, Pentagon Alerts House, Senate Panels to New Classified WikiLeaks Release, 
BLOOMBERG (Nov. 24, 2010, 12:23 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-11-24/ 
pentagon-warns-house-senate-defense-panels-of-more-wikileaks-documents.html; Philip Shenon, 
Pentagon Manhunt, DAILY BEAST (June 10, 2010), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2010/ 
06/10/wikileaks-founder-julian-assange-hunted-by-pentagon-over-massive-leak.html. The Obama 
administration has made a concerted effort to prosecute leaks, and its civil-prosecutorial efforts, 
like its military-prosecutorial efforts against Bradley Manning, appear to be part of this 
campaign. See Carrie Johnson, Case Against WikiLeaks Part of Broader Campaign, NPR  
(May 11, 2011), http://www.npr.org/2011/05/11/136173262/case-against-wikileaks-part-of-
broader-campaign. 
 49. This refers only to the criminal prosecution of Julian Assange and others involved with 
WikiLeaks. The criminal prosecution of Bradley Manning, who allegedly stole and passed along 
the documents, is quite simple, as he is currently in custody and likely has no constitutional 
protection. 
 50. Adam Entous & Evan Perez, Prosecutors Eye WikiLeaks Charges, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 21, 
2010), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704488404575441673460880204.html. 
 51. See Manne, supra note 12, at 34 (describing how at least one WikiLeaks volunteer 
dropped out of the group due to fear of criminal prosecution). 
 52. The federal Espionage Act criminalizes obtaining national-security information with 
the intent to use the information or reason to believe that the information is to be used to the 
injury of the United States or knowing that the person who obtained the information had such 
intent, and the Act does not limit its reach only to citizens. See 18 U.S.C. § 793(a)–(b) (2006); 
see also Julian Ku, Can the U.S. Prosecute WikiLeaks’ Founder? Sure, if They Can Catch Him, OPINIO 
JURIS (Aug. 21, 2010, 12:11 AM), http://opiniojuris.org/2010/08/21/can-the-us-prosecute-
wikileaks-founder-sure-if-they-can-catch-him/ (arguing that the Espionage Act could be applied 
to Assange). But see Lolita C. Baldor, Can the Government Actually Plug the WikiLeak?, MIL. TIMES 
(Aug. 7, 2010), http://www.militarytimes.com/news/2010/08/ap_wikileaks_080710/ (citing 
expert opinion that “it’s not clear” that U.S. law would apply to a foreign citizen). 
 53. I discuss in somewhat more detail the legal framework within which Assange could be 
prosecuted and his constitutional defenses, infra Part III.B. This Article does not, however, 
purport to offer a comprehensive legal analysis of criminal prosecution under the Espionage 
Act, nor of extradition. Yochai Benkler’s article does not either, but he does offer more details. 
See Benkler, supra note 12, at 337–38, 363–65. 
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whistle’s sound and range and making the government vulnerable to 
charges of a cover-up.54 
An earlier episode in which a wealthy banking firm sought to stifle a 
WikiLeaks release illustrates the difficulty, perhaps even futility, of fighting 
the site’s high-tech vigilante transparency through legal means. In 2008, 
Bank Julius Baer, a Swiss firm, and its Cayman Island sister company sought 
to enjoin the site after it had posted documents—some of which the firms 
claimed were fraudulent—that apparently showed that the bank was helping 
its clients launder money and avoid taxes.55 After issuing a temporary 
restraining order when WikiLeaks failed to appear at a preliminary hearing, 
a U.S. district court judge was forced to conclude that the plaintiffs’ interests 
in stopping the disclosure could not support an injunction against 
WikiLeaks, given the strength of First Amendment protections against prior 
restraint.56 But constitutional doctrine was not the court’s sole concern. The 
plaintiffs’ complaint against WikiLeaks raised complex geographical issues—
Assange is an Australian citizen who was living in Kenya at the time—that 
limited the extent of the court’s jurisdiction over the case.57 Even more 
significantly, the court could not confidently impose any judgment on the 
website, given the fact that the information had already been circulated 
globally and the site could simply evade any order to take down the 
documents by mirroring its site on servers around the world.58 Soon after 
the court lifted the temporary restraining order, Bank Julius Baer 
abandoned the lawsuit.59 
Alternative, nonlegal strategies seem equally likely to prove ineffective 
as a long-term strategy to end the WikiLeaks threat. To consider the means 
available to stop or answer WikiLeaks, the U.S. Army Counterintelligence 
Center commissioned a secret 2008 report on the site;60 ironically and 
 
 54. See STANLEY I. KUTLER, THE WARS OF WATERGATE 110–11 (1990) (discussing how the 
Pentagon Papers’ political impact was intensified by the Nixon administration’s response to 
them; most significantly, the leak led to the creation of the White House “Plumbers,” a secret 
group that engaged in illegal activity, including the break-in of the Democratic National 
Committee headquarters in the Watergate building); RUDENSTINE, supra note 12, at 5–6 
(same); see also SCHOENFELD, supra note 10, at 183 (noting that efforts to suppress the Pentagon 
Papers actually increased attention to them). 
 55. An inside account of the Bank Julius Baer leak appears in DOMSCHEIT-BERG, supra note 
12, at 17–33 (the author refers to the institution as the “Julius Bär Bank”). 
 56. Bank Julius Baer & Co. v. WikiLeaks, 535 F. Supp. 2d 980, 984–85 (N.D. Cal. 2008). 
 57. Id. at 984. 
 58. Id. at 985. 
 59. Thomas Claburn, Swiss Bank Abandons Lawsuit Against WikiLeaks, INFORMATIONWEEK 
(Mar. 6, 2008), http://www.informationweek.com/news/206902154. 
 60. MICHAEL D. HORVATH, CYBER COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENTS BRANCH, ARMY 
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE CTR., WIKILEAKS.ORG—AN ONLINE REFERENCE TO FOREIGN 
INTELLIGENCE SERVICES, INSURGENTS, OR TERRORIST GROUPS? (2008), available at http://mirror. 
wikileaks.info/leak/us-intel-wikileaks.pdf (also available at http://www.wired.com/images_ 
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perhaps unsurprisingly, WikiLeaks obtained the report in March 2010 and 
swiftly posted it on the Web.61 The report’s conclusions and tepid 
prescriptions likely disappointed and depressed military officials. Employing 
aggressive tactics would, if made public, risk generating public attention and 
outrage and thereby magnify the original embarrassment that the 
disclosures caused. Recognizing the military’s vulnerability and impotence, 
the report takes an almost elegiac tone in its exceptionally accurate 
predictions of what would occur only two years after the report was written. 
WikiLeaks has or will receive classified documents, the report warned, and 
disclosure websites like WikiLeaks posed a permanent threat to the military’s 
efforts to secure information from disclosure.62 The report concluded that 
the only effective response would be to secure classified information and 
punish leakers—a strategy it concluded was unlikely to deter those “insiders” 
who “believe [that it] is their obligation to expose alleged wrongdoing 
within [the Department of Defense] through inappropriate venues.”63 In his 
preface to WikiLeaks’ posting of the report, Assange proudly and 
dramatically claimed that U.S. intelligence planned to “destroy” WikiLeaks.64 
But the WikiLeaks model of decentralized digital distribution of illegally 
obtained classified information thus appears resistant—if not impervious—
to efforts to contain it. The threat of prosecution and disruption may be 
real, but the state appears to be as powerless and frustrated with WikiLeaks 
as the site is with the state. 
This situation—in which an array of potential whistle-blowers enjoys 
access to huge caches of documents and can threaten to expose military and 
diplomatic decisions during a relatively unpopular war—parallels the 
legendary role that Daniel Ellsberg and his coconspirators played during the 
Vietnam War, when they used photocopy machines to distribute the 
purloined documents that became known as the Pentagon Papers.65 Ellsberg 
himself quickly trumpeted the analogy, especially after WikiLeaks gained 
 
blogs/threatlevel/2010/03/wikithreat.pdf); see also Benkler, supra note 12, at 317–20 
(summarizing the report). 
 61. Elizabeth Montalbano, Army: Wikileaks a National Security Threat, INFORMATIONWEEK 
(Mar. 16, 2010), http://www.informationweek.com/news/government/security/223900094; 
Stephanie Strom, Pentagon Sees a Threat from Online Muckrakers, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 17, 2010), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/18/us/18wiki.html. 
 62. HORVATH, supra note 60, at 21–22. 
 63. Id. at 21. 
 64. See Press Release, Wikileaks, U.S. Intelligence Planned To Destroy WikiLeaks (Mar. 15, 
2010), available at http://www.wired.com/images_blogs/threatlevel/2010/03/wikithreat.pdf. 
At least one news story suggested that the military might have been considering launching “a 
cyber attack against the website” in the late summer and fall of 2010, the period between the 
release of the Afghanistan and Iraq documents. See Baldor, supra note 52. 
 65. But see Richard Tofel, Why WikiLeaks’ “War Logs” Are No Pentagon Papers, PROPUBLICA 
(July 26, 2010), http://www.propublica.org/article/why-wikileaks-war-logs-are-no-pentagon-
papers (arguing that WikiLeaks’ Afghanistan disclosures lack the historical importance of the 
documents Ellsberg released). 
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worldwide notoriety from its 2010 releases. Although Ellsberg had initially 
turned down WikiLeaks’ initial recruitment to serve on its advisory board,66 
after the Collateral Murder video release he declared: “The Internet is there to 
bring out this evidence, when a terribly wrongful, reckless criminal act is 
being prepared. . . . [T]he anger of the government over this leak suggests 
that [WikiLeaks has] been successful so far.”67 Assange’s celebrity status and 
his well-earned paranoia about efforts to discredit him, along with actual 
press reports that seemed to discredit him (that may or may not have been 
slanderous, as his supporters argued),68 strengthen the analogy to Ellsberg, 
who was the target of illegal and frightening efforts by the White House to 
destroy him.69 
Although law and technology may not impose clear limitations on 
WikiLeaks, the site does not have unlimited capacity. As Assange has 
conceded, WikiLeaks is “completely source-dependent” and must wait for 
and then sort through the submissions it receives, which vary in quality and 
relevance.70 The enormous Iraq, Afghanistan, and State Department leaks 
required the site’s contributors to expend significant time and effort in 
preparing for their release, especially as the site began to spend more time 
evaluating the material and working with mainstream news organizations.71 
Meanwhile, it has been forced to wage numerous collateral battles: with the 
companies on whom it relies for document storage, servers, and donated 
funds; with governments in legal forums; with detractors and critics in the 
 
 66. Manne, supra note 12, at 30. 
 67. Noam Cohen, What Would Daniel Ellsberg Do With the Pentagon Papers Today?, N.Y.  
TIMES (Apr. 18, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/19/business/media/19link.html 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 68. See Burns & Somaiya, supra note 31 (describing internal dissent within WikiLeaks and 
disgruntled former members, and characterizing Assange in an unflattering light). 
 69. Glenn Greenwald, an outspoken critic of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars and of 
Obama’s continuation of some of the Bush administration’s policies regarding those wars (and 
of related issues like executive branch secrecy), berated a critical New York Times profile as 
“Nixonian” and a “sleazy hit piece” intended to “smear” Assange and compared the Times story 
to Nixon’s efforts to minimize the damage caused by the Pentagon Papers. Glenn Greenwald, 
The Nixonian Henchman of Today: At the NYT, SALON (Oct. 24, 2010, 10:25 AM), http://www. 
salon.com/2010/10/24/assange_2/ (criticizing Burns & Somaiya, supra note 31). On Nixon’s 
efforts to destroy Ellsberg by authorizing the Plumbers to leak private, stolen information from 
his psychiatrist, among other things, see RICHARD REEVES, PRESIDENT NIXON: ALONE IN THE 
WHITE HOUSE 348–49, 368–69 (2001); BARRY WERTH, 31 DAYS: GERALD FORD, THE NIXON 
PARDON, AND A GOVERNMENT IN CRISIS 84–87 (2006); CARL BERNSTEIN & BOB WOODWARD, ALL 
THE PRESIDENT’S MEN 312–13, 316 (1974). 
 70. Time’s Julian Assange Interview: Full Transcript/Audio, TIME (Dec. 1, 2010), 
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2034040,00.html [hereinafter Time’s Julian 
Assange Interview]. 
 71. See Harrell, supra note 31. 
FENSTER_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/13/2012  1:36 PM 
2012] WIKILEAKS AND TRANSPARENCY 769 
press; and with government entities and others who have attempted to take 
WikiLeaks and its mirror sites down through denial-of-service attacks.72 
The battle is not an entirely losing one; the disembodied, transnational, 
data-driven universe that WikiLeaks inhabits allows clever workarounds and 
David-against-Goliath battles that can sometimes reward technical virtuosity 
and tactics over the brute force of state authority and capitalist logic.73 Such 
is the anarchic spirit of the hacker and cypherpunk subculture from which 
Assange emerged;74 as John Perry Barlow, cofounder of the Electronic 
Freedom Foundation and longtime theorist of the Internet’s libertarian 
possibilities, tweeted in December 2010: “The first serious infowar is now 
engaged. The field of battle is WikiLeaks. You are the troops.”75 
This, then, is the somewhat contested understanding of WikiLeaks as an 
institution as of January 2012: secretive and hidden behind a veil of 
encryption and technological sophistication; righteously committed to the 
cause of whistle-blowing, with the purpose of informing the wired world—
which is to say the whole world—of secret, prevaricating, and corrupt 
authorities; a model for other websites and distribution channels to follow; 
and outside the normal channels of either a nation or of a commercial or 
nonprofit enterprise; but led by a perhaps flawed individual who serves as its 
public face. The WikiLeaks narrative presents the strange, at least temporary 
triumph of a small, thoroughly independent, underdog medium of 
disclosure over enormously powerful state actors. The WikiLeaks disclosures 
both represent and portend enormous changes in how secret documents 
become public and in the meaning and extent of transparency in a wired, 
digital age. Their celebrity suggests that disclosure matters—that to some 
degree, the documents have enlightened the public, affected the ability of 
state actors to perform their jobs, and created risks for the ongoing efforts 
that the documents revealed. 
II.  WIKILEAKS’ THEORIES 
In different venues, Assange has identified two related but quite distinct 
purposes for the WikiLeaks project, each of which builds upon a theory of 
disclosure’s effects. The more conventional explanation, which he has 
frequently offered in interviews, adopts the reformist ideal underlying the 
 
 72. See LEIGH & HARDING, supra note 12, at 203–07, 242; Benkler, supra note 12, at 337–
47; Andy Greenberg, An Interview with WikiLeaks’ Julian Assange, FORBES (NOV. 29, 2010), http:// 
forbes.com/sites/andygreenberg/2010/11/29/an-interview-with-wikileaks-julian-assange/. 
 73. See The War on WikiLeaks: Fingered, ECONOMIST (Dec. 9, 2010), http://www.economist. 
com/node/17674107 (describing WikiLeaks’ technical and financial workarounds for efforts 
to block public access and donations to the site, as well as unaffiliated hackers’ attempts to 
disrupt corporations and websites that acted against WikiLeaks). 
 74. See Manne, supra note 12, at 21–22. 
 75. John Perry Barlow, @JPBarlow, TWITTER (Dec. 3, 2010), http://twitter.com/#!/ 
jpbarlow/status/10627544017534976. 
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disclosure of government information as it is understood by transparency 
advocates: disclosure will lead to a more knowledgeable public and 
ultimately to a more accountable, responsive, and effective state.76 The 
alternative explanation, which Assange developed most fully in essays he 
posted on the Internet as he was building WikiLeaks, proposes that leaks can 
perform a more radical, revolutionary function by disabling what he views as 
authoritarian, illegitimate governments.77 These explanations may not be 
mutually exclusive, and as explained below, Assange’s strategic deployment 
of them in different forums may not entirely be a duplicitous effort to mask 
a secret, radical intent. Their dual character suggests, however, that 
WikiLeaks hopes to provide more than simply a conventional means to 
further the widely shared goal of liberal democratic governance to which the 
more mainstream elements of the transparency movement aspire. In doing 
so, WikiLeaks aspires to serve as a far-reaching and original model for 
disclosure and for the relationship between states and their publics, and 
among citizens across nations in a networked world. 
A.  DISCLOSURE AS LIBERAL REFORM 
Many advocates of transparency have not fully embraced WikiLeaks.78 
This is, in part, because the site provoked widespread outrage among 
elected officials and conservative commentators against unauthorized 
disclosures.79 It also inadvertently assisted legislative efforts to tighten 
control on classified information, as it helped Republican opponents to stall 
efforts to reform the Whistleblower Protection Act at the end of the 112th 
Congress, and it provoked a potentially overbroad proposal to extend 
criminal liability under the Espionage Act to sites like WikiLeaks.80 Besides 
 
 76. See infra Part II.A. 
 77. See infra Part II.B. 
 78. See, e.g., John F Moore, WikiLeaks Is a Blow to Open Government, GOV’T IN THE LAB (Nov. 
28, 2010), http://govinthelab.com/wikileaks-is-a-blow-to-open-government/ (fearing that the 
site would destroy the trust between government and its citizens and between different 
governments, which is necessary for transparency reform); WikiLeaks Shines a Light on the Limits 
of Techno-Politics, WHIMSLEY (Dec. 5, 2010), http://whimsley.typepad.com/whimsley/2010/ 
12/wikileaks-shines-a-light-on-the-limits-of-techno-politics.html (discussing the difference in 
aims of transparency proponents, who seek to improve how government functions, and 
WikiLeaks, which seeks to make government operations more difficult); Anthony D. Williams, 
Could WikiLeaks Set Back Open Government?, ANTHONY D. WILLIAMS (Nov. 29, 2010), http:// 
anthonydwilliams.com/2010/11/29/could-wikileaks-set-back-open-government/ (worrying 
that the headway open-government advocates had made with government officials in terms of 
getting them to recognize the advantages of transparency might be lost as a result of 
WikiLeaks). 
 79. See Benkler, supra note 12, at 331–33. 
 80. See H.R. 6506, 111th Cong. (2010) (proposing to amend 18 U.S.C. § 798 (2006) to 
expand criminal liability for disseminating classified information); Robert Brodsky, Whistleblower 
Protection Bill Dies Again, on the 1-Yard Line, GOV’T EXECUTIVE (Dec. 23, 2010), http://www. 
govexec.com/dailyfed/1210/122310rb1.htm; Glenn Greenwald, WikiLeaks Reveals More Than 
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harming advocates’ reform efforts, open-government proponents also found 
that the site’s disclosures conflicted with their own attempts to advocate 
legal and administrative reform. In the wake of the Collateral Murder video’s 
release, Steven Aftergood, who runs the Federation of American Scientists’ 
widely respected Project on Government Secrecy, argued that the site’s 
penchant for mass, mostly unedited disclosures of secret documents 
constituted a refusal to respect both the rule of law and the rights of private 
individuals to privacy and security.81 Although he later softened his criticism 
as WikiLeaks began to redact personal information and collaborate with 
mainstream news organizations that were willing to consult with government 
agencies prior to disclosure, Aftergood continued to criticize the site for 
appearing more interested in defeating rather than fixing the classification 
system.82 Like the transparency advocates with whom they frequently work 
on open-government issues, journalists and their advocacy organizations 
have also failed to embrace the site as one of their own.83 At the same time, 
however, some members of the open-government community viewed 
WikiLeaks’ success as a necessary response and counterweight to excessive 
government secrecy.84 For Thomas Blanton, director of the National 
Security Archive at George Washington University, “[t]he only remedies that 
will genuinely curb leaks are ones that force the government to disgorge 
most of the information it holds rather than hold more information more 
 
Just Government Secrets, SALON (Nov. 30, 2010, 5:31 AM), http://www.salon.com/2010/11/30/ 
wikileaks_10/singleton/ (discussing commentators who were outraged by WikiLeaks, some of 
whom called loudly for Assange’s assassination). 
 81. Steven Aftergood, WikiLeaks Fails “Due Diligence” Review, SECRECY NEWS (June 28, 2010, 
11:19 AM), http://www.fas.org/blog/secrecy/2010/06/wikileaks_review.html. 
 82. From One Transparency Advocate to Another: Transcript, ON THE MEDIA (July 30,  
2010), http://www.onthemedia.org/2010/jul/30/from-one-transparency-advocate-to-another/ 
transcript/. 
 83. Nancy A. Youssef, In WikiLeaks Fight, U.S. Journalists Take a Pass, MCCLATCHY (Jan. 9, 
2011), http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2011/01/09/106445/in-wikileaks-fight-us-journalists.html. 
 84. See, e.g., Stephen Collins, Open Government in a WikiLeaks World, GOV’T TECH. REV. 
(Dec. 21, 2010), http://www.govtechreview.com.au/news/open-government-in-a-wikileaks-
world (“[P]henomena such as Wikileaks are a symptom, rather than the disease itself. Wikileaks 
exists because of the failure of governments around the world to operate openly.”); Ron 
Deibert, The Post-Cablegate Era, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 11, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
roomfordebate/2010/12/09/what-has-wikileaks-started/after-wikileaks-a-new-era (“WikiLeaks 
is only a symptom of a much larger phenomenon to which governments, businesses and 
individuals will all have to get accustomed. Our lives have been turned inside out by a digital 
world of our own spinning. We will need new rules, norms and principles to adjust to this new 
environment.”); Alex Howard, Is WikiLeaks Open Government?, GOV 2.0 (Nov. 28, 2010, 2:13 
PM), http://gov20.govfresh.com/is-wikileaks-open-government/; Jeff Jarvis, WikiLeaks: Power 
Shifts from Secrecy to Transparency, BUZZMACHINE (Dec. 4, 2010, 2:40 PM), http://www. 
buzzmachine.com/2010/12/04/wikileaks-power-shifts-from-secrecy-to-transparency/ (“[I]n the 
internet age, power shifts from those who hold secrets to those [who] create openness. That is 
our emerging reality.”). 
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tightly.”85 But whether defending or criticizing WikiLeaks, transparency 
advocates have viewed the site as something decidedly unconventional and 
distinct from their own reformist efforts. 
Nevertheless, in widely broadcasted or published interviews, Assange 
has frequently portrayed the site as a conventional, journalistic endeavor to 
make major public institutions, especially governments, more visible to the 
public.86 In an opinion piece he published in a leading Australian 
newspaper at the height of the public controversy over the diplomatic-cable 
leaks, Assange offered a recognizably reformist explanation for the site’s 
work and its disclosure of government documents. The WikiLeaks method is 
essentially journalistic, he claimed—a form of “scientific journalism” that 
represents an advance over traditional media reporting.87 As Assange wrote: 
We work with other media outlets to bring people the news, but 
also to prove it is true. Scientific journalism allows you to read a 
news story, then to click online to see the original document it is 
based on. That way you can judge for yourself: Is the story true? Did 
the journalist report it accurately?88 
In this telling, WikiLeaks’ essential goal is to reveal the state and other key 
institutions to the world—not only to the citizens who can hold public 
institutions directly accountable, but to everyone who is able to “see 
evidence of the truth.”89 “[I]f we maximize the reliable, verified information 
about how the world is working,” Assange told an interviewer, “then we start 
to produce more sophisticated and intelligent structures that respond to the 
abuses in societies and also the opportunities there may be in society.”90 The 
only limitation that WikiLeaks places on disclosure—one that it shares with 
most mainstream news outlets—is that it attempts to redact information or 
 
 85. Espionage Act and the Legal and Constitutional Issues Raised by WikiLeaks: Hearing Before the 
H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 79 (2010) (statement of Thomas Blanton, Director, 
National Security Archive, George Washington University), available at http://www.gpo.gov/ 
fdsys/pkg/CHRG-111hhrg63081/pdf/CHRG-111hhrg63081.pdf. 
 86. This is true as well for Bradley Manning’s motives, at least to the extent they have been 
disclosed. See LEIGH & HARDING, supra note 12, at 84–87. 
 87. Julian Assange, Don’t Shoot Messenger for Revealing Uncomfortable Truths, AUSTRALIAN 
(Dec. 8, 2010, 12:00 AM), http://www.theaustralian.com.au/in-depth/wikileaks/dont-shoot-
messenger-for-revealing-uncomfortable-truths/story-fn775xjq-1225967241332. 
 88. Id. 
 89. About WikiLeaks, supra note 4. 
 90. Harrell, supra note 31; see also Julian Assange on WikiLeaks, War and Resisting Government 
Crackdown, DEMOCRACY NOW! (Dec. 31, 2010), http://www.democracynow.org/2010/12/31/ 
julian_assange_on_wikileaks_war_and (transcript of interview in which Assange explains that 
WikiLeaks’ “modus operandi . . . is to get out suppressed information into the public, where the 
press and the public and our nation’s politics can work on it to produce better outcomes”); 
Time’s Julian Assange Interview, supra note 70 (presenting Assange’s claim that transparency can 
“achieve a more just society” by allowing a more knowledgeable, engaged public to oppose 
“abusive plans or behavior”). 
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delay disclosure so as to minimize any harm that might foreseeably result 
from publication.91 
Viewed this way, WikiLeaks’ effort to cast itself as a journalistic 
enterprise does not appear to be simply a ruse to gain First Amendment 
protection.92 The site wants to act, and to be seen as acting, as a medium of 
disclosure similar to the conventional legacy newspapers with whom it 
explicitly partnered in the diplomatic-cable disclosures. More pointedly, 
Assange describes WikiLeaks as part of the long-standing tradition of radical, 
truth-telling journalists, hearkening back to the English Civil War.93 It 
aspires—at least in part—to perform what Assange describes as the essential 
role of the “Fourth Estate” within a liberal democracy:94 investigator of fact, 
provider of scientific, true data to an inquiring public that will act on the 
truth it is presented, and compiler of the true historical record.95 The public 
would thereby have access to authentic facts.96 Deploying the classical, 
pervasive discourse of transparency advocacy, Assange’s claims amount to an 
assertion that “WikiLeaks can enforce the human right to know, the right to 
speak, and, above all, the right to communicate information.”97 
 
 91. See Obrist, supra note 30; Richard Waters, Online Leaks: A Digital Deluge, FIN. TIMES 
(July 30, 2010, 10:06 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/9098a06a-9c1c-11df-a7a4-00144 
feab49a.html#axzz1bkWjzeLA. 
 92. On the question of whether the First Amendment applies to WikiLeaks, and the 
significance of this question, see Benkler, supra note 12, at 351–63; Mike Dorf, WikiLeaks and the 
First Amendment, DORF ON LAW (July 30, 2010, 12:47 AM), http://www.dorfonlaw.org/2010/ 
07/wikileaks-and-first-amendment.html; see also Jack Goldsmith, Why the U.S. Shouldn’t Try Julian 
Assange, WASH. POST (Feb. 11, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/ 
article/2011/02/10/AR2011021006324.html. 
 93. See Julian Assange, What’s New About WikiLeaks?, NEW STATESMAN (Apr. 14, 2011), 
http://www.newstatesman.com/digital/2011/04/civil-war-wikileaks-newspapers. 
 94. See Potter Stewart, “Or of the Press,” 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631, 634 (1975) (identifying the 
term’s derivation in the British liberalism of Thomas Carlyle and Edmund Burke to refer to 
“fourth institution outside the Government as an additional check on the three official 
branches”). 
 95. WikiLeaks Is the Method We Use Towards Our Goal of a More Just Society: Assange, HINDU 
(Apr. 13, 2011), http://www.hindu.com/2011/04/13/stories/2011041357631300.htm. 
 96. Ironically, Assange’s popular-democratic vision of a scientific journalism free of 
interests and capable of appealing to public reason parallels that of the far more statist 
Progressive Era intellectual Walter Lippmann, who proposed creating independent intelligence 
bureaus to process information that would create a “valid picture” of the political environment. 
WALTER LIPPMANN, PUBLIC OPINION 379–97, 407–08 (Macmillan Co. 1949) (1922). Lippmann 
trusted experts far more than the radical democrat Assange, but both seek a fix that can 
provide the public access to the authentic truth of a knowable world. See WALTER LIPPMANN, 
LIBERTY AND THE NEWS 40 (Princeton Univ. Press 2008) (1920) (“[L]iberty is the name we give 
to measures by which we protect and increase the veracity of the information upon which we 
act.”). 
 97. Mark Fenster, The Transparency Fix: Advocating Legal Rights and Their Alternatives in the 
Pursuit of a Visible State, 73 U. PITT. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012) (manuscript at 51 n.218) 
(available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1918154) (citing Obrist, 
supra note 30) (chronicling the “rights” approach to transparency advocacy, as enforceable by 
legal and technological means). 
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B.  DISCLOSURE AS RADICAL RESISTANCE 
The conventional narrative is not the only one Assange relates, 
however—it is only the more public one. As he developed the WikiLeaks 
site, Assange wrote several short posts and posted longer essays on his 
publicly available blog that offered a more radical understanding of 
transparency’s potential and the political consequences of a major, never-
ending series of leaks.98 In this forum and others, Assange has elaborated an 
alternative theory of political information and a series of political positions 
that extend well beyond the liberal democratic theories upon which 
conventional transparency advocates rely and that traditional journalism has 
deployed. 
In his most fully developed essay, Conspiracy as Governance, Assange 
writes that to “radically shift regime behavior . . . [w]e must understand the 
key generative structure of bad governance.”99 Here, “regime” need not 
refer to a government entity, as “governance” is a broad enough term to 
encompass operational control and management practices of corporate as 
well as state entities.100 He appears to intend the term to include anything 
from a superpower to an arm of the state and from a multinational financial 
firm to a small company or even a collective endeavor—any institution 
through which power flows and can be exercised against an individual.101 
The generative structure of bad governance, Assange argues, is 
“conspiratorial interactions among the political elite” that allow them to 
communicate means to maintain and strengthen their “authoritarian 
power.”102 Conspiracies are “cognitive devices,” he explains, that operate by 
 
 98. The best account of these writings is Julian Assange and the Computer Conspiracy; “To 
Destroy This Invisible Government,” ZUNGUZUNGU (Nov. 29, 2010, 9:05 AM), http:// 
zunguzungu.wordpress.com/2010/11/29/julian-assange-and-the-computer-conspiracy-“to-
destroy-this-invisible-government”/ [hereinafter Julian Assange and the Computer Conspiracy]. See 
also Peter Ludlow, Rethinking Conspiracy: The Political Philosophy of Julian Assange  
(2010) (unpublished essay), available at http://commonsenseatheism.com/wp-content/ 
uploads/2010/12/Ludlow-Rethinking-Conspiracy-the-Political-Philosophy-of-Julian-Assange.pdf. 
 99. JULIAN ASSANGE, CONSPIRACY AS GOVERNANCE 1, 1 (Dec. 3, 2006) [hereinafter 
CONSPIRACY AS GOVERNANCE], available at http://cryptome.org/0002/ja-conspiracies.pdf. That 
essay and another, JULIAN ASSANGE, STATE AND TERRORIST CONSPIRACIES (Nov. 10, 2006), are 
available as part of the same file on the Cryptome website. The former essay is a revision of the 
latter, written less than a month later, and is a more authoritative version of Assange’s 
argument. 
 100. Thus, the definition extends to WikiLeaks’ rumored release (as of December 2011) of 
documents stolen from an as-yet unnamed bank (long presumed to be Bank of America) and 
leaked to the site. See The Leaky Corporation, ECONOMIST (Feb. 24, 2011), http://www.economist. 
com/node/18226961. The release, Assange told Forbes, “will give a true and representative 
insight into how banks behave at the executive level in a way that will stimulate investigations 
and reforms, I presume.” Greenberg, supra note 72. 
 101. Julian Assange and the Computer Conspiracy, supra note 98. 
 102. CONSPIRACY AS GOVERNANCE, supra note 99, at 2. 
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accumulating, processing, and acting upon information.103 They keep their 
strategies and plans secret from the public to avoid creating popular 
resistance and only allow them to be revealed when resistance is futile or 
incapable of overcoming “the efficiencies of naked power.”104 Secrecy thus 
plays a necessary and central role in bad governance. 
While concealing itself to those outside, a conspiratorial regime must 
nevertheless communicate internally. Each conspirator operates at a distinct 
position within the conspiratorial structure, with some more powerful and 
knowledgeable about the entire structure than others.105 This dispersal of 
authority has the advantage of hindering attempts to destroy the state 
through the targeted removal of particular conspirators, whether by violent, 
legal, or political means; unless either all of the conspirators are removed or 
the links among all of the conspirators are severed, the conspiracy itself can 
survive.106 Decentralization makes information exchange among members 
both more essential and more difficult. In order for the conspiracy to 
operate, those with more authority must be able to command those beneath 
them; but to the extent that the multiple lines of authority are complex and 
obscure, those commands cannot simply be spoken in face-to-face 
meetings.107 A regime’s reliance on concealed communication is thus both a 
source of power and an unavoidable vulnerability. A conspiracy can devise 
and execute secret plans and orders, but its channels must be functional and 
secure. 
For Assange, this vulnerability represents the best hope for resisting and 
ending the regime’s rule and its “bad governance.”108 He calls for “throttling 
the conspiracy” by “constricting (reducing the weight of)” the most 
significant links (which he terms “high weight”) that “bridge regions” of the 
conspiratorial system.109 A revolutionary movement—and indeed, Assange is 
calling here for overturning existing state apparatuses—may thus succeed 
through efforts to “deceive or blind a conspiracy by distorting or restricting 
the information available to it,” or through “unstructured attacks on links or 
through throttling and separating” the conspiratorial structure.110 Destroy the 
 
 103. Id. at 3. 
 104. Id. at 2. 
 105. Id. at 2–3. 
 106. Id. at 2–3. 
 107. As Assange explained in an interview with the BBC:  
There is a reason why people write things down. Yes, you can organise a small 
group of people to do something with just word of mouth. But if you want to enact 
policy, for example, to get Guantanamo Bay guards to do something, get the 
grunts to do something, you’ve got to write it down or it will not be followed.  
Transcript: The Assange Interview, BBC NEWS—TODAY (Dec. 21, 2010, 12:26 PM), http://news. 
bbc.co.uk/today/hi/today/newsid_9309000/9309320.stm. 
 108. CONSPIRACY AS GOVERNANCE, supra note 99, at 1. 
 109. Id. at 4. 
 110. Id. at 5. 
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regime’s ability to communicate with itself or degrade the quality of the 
information that the regime processes and passes along, and the regime will 
no longer be able to rule as effectively and efficiently. Assange uses a 
metaphor that brings the “conspiratorial” state to life: “When we look at an 
authoritarian conspiracy as a whole, we see a system of interacting organs, a 
beast with arteries and veins whose blood may be thickened and slowed until 
it falls, stupefied; unable to sufficiently comprehend and control the forces 
in its environment.”111 
He has mixed his metaphors almost beyond intelligibility—shifting 
from removing links to thickening blood—but his basic point is clear: 
leaking is not merely a tool for reform but a weapon for resistance and a way 
to deprive authoritative institutions of their means to control their 
communications and subjugate their populations. In a now unavailable blog 
post written soon after he posted the Conspiracy as Governance essay, he 
explained: 
 The more secretive or unjust an organization is, the more leaks 
induce fear and paranoia in its leadership and planning coterie. 
This must result in minimization of efficient internal 
communications mechanisms (an increase in cognitive “secrecy 
tax”) and consequent system-wide cognitive decline resulting in 
decreased ability to hold onto power as the environment demands 
adaption. 
 Hence in a world where leaking is easy, secretive or unjust 
systems are nonlinearly hit relative to open, just systems. Since 
unjust systems, by their nature induce opponents, and in many 
places barely have the upper hand, mass leaking leaves them 
exquisitely vulnerable to those who seek to replace them with more 
open forms of governance [sic].112 
Stripped of its ability to control information, and therefore to operate as a 
conspiracy, the regime can no longer suppress the resistance it creates 
through its actions.113 It will fall, and the people will finally be able to rule 
themselves. 
Viewed in this light, the question of whether WikiLeaks’ disclosures 
revealed anything meaningful or new about geopolitical or military 
strategy—part of the debate that has pervaded the aftermath of the 
 
 111. Id. 
 112. Julian Assange, The Non Linear Effects of Leaks on Unjust Systems of Governance, IQ.ORG 
(Dec. 31, 2006). Assange apparently stopped posting at IQ.org in 2007, and the site is no 
longer operational. See http://www.iq.org. But this post is available at http://cryptome.org/ 
0002/ja-conspiracies.pdf. For this and other posts from IQ.org, see also http://www.anorak.co. 
uk/wp-content/uploads/assange-IQ.org_.pdf. 
 113. See CONSPIRACY AS GOVERNANCE, supra note 99, at 5. 
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Afghanistan, Iraq, and diplomatic-cable releases114—is less important than 
the fact that diplomats, military leaders, and other mid- to high-level 
government officials can no longer assume that their off-record, secretive 
communications among themselves can remain confidential.115 The quality 
of the information leaked proves less significant, in other words, than the 
quantity of the documents leaked. At the height of their threat thus far, the 
WikiLeaks releases have appeared as the first wave of an oncoming 
disclosure torrent, with their breathtaking number of leaked documents 
coupled with the ongoing threat of more documents to be released in the 
near future and more leaks to come, and the possibility that yet more sites 
will be created that will provide safe harbor for even more leaks. The 
content of disclosed documents still matters—leaking the doodles of low-
level functionaries would not shake the conspiracy’s communicative 
capabilities—but only as a means to the larger end of regime change, which 
occurs as a result of the act of torrential disclosure. Disclosure’s effects, for 
Assange, constitute a mortal threat to conspiratorial, institutional authority. 
Given the radical nature of these arguments, it is certainly possible that 
Assange’s reformist statements were a rhetorical strategy for public 
consumption. They may have been intended to persuade mainstream media 
to collaborate with WikiLeaks and to assure charitable foundations and 
other potential sources of funding that the site was no more radical than any 
emerging idea or technology. The site’s self-portrayal as a truth-telling, 
journalistic medium might also have been a clever legal strategy—a way of 
appearing to function like a traditional news outlet worthy of traditional 
First Amendment protections. There is evidence that Assange was partially 
motivated by those concerns, and a recent profile suggests that many of his, 
and the site’s, well-calculated, domesticated statements were more strategic 
than heartfelt.116 
Nevertheless, Assange occasionally has explained his seemingly 
disparate and conflicting goals in two ways that reconcile the tension 
between these approaches. First, in a 2009 interview, he noted three 
separate audiences for the documents that WikiLeaks exposes: (1) the 
 
 114. See infra Part III.C.1–2. 
 115. SLAVOJ ŽIŽEK, LIVING IN THE END TIMES 408–09 (rev. ed. 2011); Julian Assange and the 
Computer Conspiracy, supra note 98. In an essay intended to dismiss WikiLeaks’ importance, 
Umberto Eco concedes this point, noting that even an “empty secret” whose content is widely 
known can cause “irreparable damage” to those who thought they controlled access to the 
secret. Umberto Eco, Not Such Wicked Leaks, PRESSEUROP (Eric Rosencrantz trans., Dec. 2, 
2010), http://www.presseurop.eu/en/content/article/414871-not-such-wicked-leaks. 
 116. See WikiLeaks:Strategy, WIKILEAKS, http://www.wikileaks.ch.nyud.net/wiki/WikiLeaks: 
Strategy (last visited Dec. 24, 2011) (declaring that the site should not “alienate” transparency 
and anticorruption groups and the organizations that fund them “without good cause,” even if 
those groups tend to be more conservative than WikiLeaks). See generally Manne, supra note 12, 
at 30 (quoting internal WikiLeaks documents in which Assange states that the site must disguise 
its radical nature). 
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general public, who, should they notice, understand, and respond to the 
document, can influence or animate legal reform; (2) those with expertise 
in the issues raised by the documents, such as law enforcement or 
competitors who can hold accountable any illegal or immoral behavior; and 
(3) the organization and individuals creating the documents, whose 
conspiracy will collapse as a result of the distrust and fear that disclosure will 
create.117 Assange’s different theories, in other words, are not mutually 
exclusive but instead predict different responses to information. 
Second, and related, his theories also predict different potential effects. 
As he explained to an editor at Time, if the behavior of 
organizations which are abusive and need to be [in] the public eye 
. . . is revealed to the public, they have one of two choices: one is to 
reform in such a way that they can be proud of their endeavors, 
and proud to display them to the public. Or the other is to lock 
down internally and to balkanize, and as a result, of course, cease 
to be as efficient as they were. To me, that is a very good outcome, 
because organizations can either be efficient, open and honest, or 
they can be closed, conspiratorial and inefficient.118 
Faced with total disclosure, the state has two choices: reform or face public 
upheaval. A state must operate as an optimal, open liberal democracy, or 
else WikiLeaks and its colleagues and competitors will create the conditions 
for regime change by imposing the total transparency that will destroy the 
state’s ability to conspire—and therefore to exist. Characterized this way, 
Assange’s seemingly conflicting theories constitute what Finn Brunton has 
called a “two-tier strategy” that combines a Habermasian ideal of the public’s 
capacity to engage in rational action and logical speech with a more radical, 
technological threat to disrupt the authoritarian state.119 Disclosure and its 
effects serve as the catalyst for both approaches. 
Assange has somewhat complicated this model of disclosure’s direct 
effects, however, by recognizing that the political and social conditions 
within which disclosure occurs inevitably shape its effects. This is true of 
both the process by which the public is enlightened and the context in 
which a political regime can change or be changed. 
He has first cautioned against a simple understanding of disclosure by 
recognizing the difficult task he has faced in reaching the public with his 
disclosures and method. Frustrated with the emerging media with which 
 
 117. See Becky Hogge, News of the World, Media Cartels and the Fiscalisation of Power:  
2009 Interview with Julian Assange, BAREFOOT TECHNOLOGIST (July 27, 2011), http:// 
barefootintocyberspace.com/2011/07/27/assange_transcript/. 
 118. Time’s Julian Assange Interview, supra note 70. 
 119. Finn Brunton, Keyspace: WikiLeaks and the Assange Papers, RADICAL PHIL., Mar./Apr. 
2011, at 8, 13, available at http://www.radicalphilosophy.com/commentary/keyspace-wikileaks-
and-the-assange-papers. 
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WikiLeaks is frequently associated, Assange has condemned blogs and other 
forms of social media for their failure to procure or produce significant 
information or add value or insight to the information on which they 
comment. He learned from WikiLeaks’ earlier releases that he could not 
depend solely on the radical possibility of crowd-sourcing and amateur 
bloggers to process and make sense of the site’s authentically sourced 
documents.120 The “scientific journalism” that WikiLeaks produces demands 
the objective truth of fact and authentic documents; social media merely 
produces and reiterates opinion within closed circles of the like-minded.121 
Having reached this conclusion, Assange decided to work closely with the 
mainstream media that could contextualize, explain, and publicize the 
documents’ complex content, while WikiLeaks made the raw documents 
available on the WikiLeaks site and its mirror sites.122 In an ironic twist, then, 
the revolutionary project that sought to expose the conspiratorial state could 
not rely upon the online cognoscenti and multitudes to inform themselves 
and the mass, nascent public. Instead, WikiLeaks chose to collaborate with 
the traditional Fourth Estate, itself a set of institutions that constitute, in 
Assange’s view, part of a broader network of linked conspirators governing 
the people, often undemocratically and unaccountably. This reformist move 
represented either a sellout, something of which Assange and WikiLeaks 
have been accused,123 or a brilliant tactic of turning a tool of power into a 
weapon of the weak. Assange’s relationship with the institutional press, 
which was never collegial, has since eroded to the point at which he 
appeared, by the fall of 2011, to embrace unredacted, mass disclosures and 
the crowd-sourcing and unorganized investigative follow-up that he had 
eschewed less than two years earlier.124 Either way, Assange had learned that 
 
 120. See Julian Assange, The Hidden Curse of Thomas Paine, GUERNICA (Apr. 29, 2008), 
http://www.guernicamag.com/blog/571/the_hidden_curse_of_thomas_pai/; Obrist, supra 
note 26. 
 121. Manne, supra note 12, at 33; see also WikiLeaks:Big Picture, WIKILEAKS, http://wikileaks. 
ch.nyud.net/wiki/WikiLeaks:Big_picture (last visited Dec. 24, 2011). 
 122. Julian Assange in Berkeley, ZUNGUZUNGU (Dec. 12, 2010, 5:53 PM), http://zunguzungu. 
wordpress.com/2010/12/12/julian-assange-in-berkeley/ (transcript of Assange’s participation 
in an academic forum at Berkeley in which he complained that bloggers and the like write 
largely to gain status for themselves among their peer groups; as a result, they “don’t give a fuck 
about the material” and fail to perform follow-up investigations into the information the 
disclosed documents reveal); see also Time’s Julian Assange Interview, supra note 70 (describing 
the process by which social media merely amplify and publicize stories, while WikiLeaks and 
major newspapers perform the “bulk of the heavy lifting” on the documents). 
 123. McCullagh, supra note 20; John Young, Wikileaks Stoned Again, CRYPTOME (Feb. 18, 
2011), http://cryptome.org/0003/wikileaks-stoned.htm. 
 124. Peter Finocchiaro, Breakdown: The New WikiLeaks Scoops, SALON (Sept. 1, 2011, 3:20 
PM), http://www.salon.com/news/feature/2011/09/01/wikileaks_revelations; Greg Mitchell, 
The Return of the WikiLeaks News & Views Blog!, NATION (Sept. 2, 2011, 1:30 PM), http://www. 
thenation.com/blog/163126/return-wikileaks-news-views-blog. The new crowd-sourcing 
method, as of September 2011, relied on Twitter postings. See Finocciaro, supra. 
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raw disclosure by itself could not directly affect the public.125 To have effects, 
and especially to have specific, desired effects, disclosures require context 
and background, as well as wide distribution. 
Assange’s second cautionary note to his otherwise optimistic theory of 
disclosure’s potential to affect democracy and the state is his recognition 
that disclosure will affect different states and publics differently. Western 
societies, Assange argues, have been “fiscalised”—a term he fails to define 
precisely, but which seems to imply a fairly traditional leftist critique of 
neoliberalism.126 The critique views Western democracies as offering formal 
political and economic freedom with a minimal state whose narrow focus on 
the protection of property and contract rights, free markets, and free trade 
allows large multinational corporations and enterprises to make most 
significant economic and social decisions.127 It also views the mass public as 
largely disengaged from a putatively democratic state, both because the 
locus of power has shifted away from politically accountable institutions and 
because the public has been seduced by the material pleasures of a 
consumer economy and the empty sensations of popular entertainment.128 
“In such an environment,” Assange has argued, “it is easy for speech to be 
‘free’ because a change in political will rarely leads to any change in the[] 
basic instruments [of power].”129 In authoritarian states like China, by 
 
 125. One means of avoiding this trap is to help build nonprofit investigative journalist 
networks, something that WikiLeaks has begun to establish in Brazil. See Tadeu Breda, “We Will 
Continue Working Even if Julian Assange Is in Jail”: Natalia Viana, Independent Collaborator of 
WikiLeaks in Brazil, Speaks on the Organization’s Ability To Transform the Core Principles of Journalism, 
NARCO NEWS BULL. (May 22, 2011), http://www.narconews.com/Issue67/article4417.html; 
Natalia Mazotte, WikiLeaks Announces Partnership with Brazilian Investigative Journalism Center, 
JOURNALISM AM. BLOG (June 24, 2011, 16:43), http://knightcenter.utexas.edu/blog/wikileaks-
announces-partnership-brazilian-investigative-journalism-center. 
 126. See Julian Assange Answers Your Questions, GUARDIAN (Dec. 3, 2010, 08:45 EST), http:// 
www.guardian.co.uk/world/blog/2010/dec/03/julian-assange-wikileaks; LEIGH & HARDING, 
supra note 12, at 56–57 (describing Assange’s ties to “anti-capitalist radicals” as well as to the 
“geeky hacker underground”). 
 127. Compare Julian Assange Answers Your Questions, supra note 126 (“The west has fiscalised 
its basic power relationships through a web of contracts, loans, shareholdings, bank holdings 
and so on.”), and Time’s Julian Assange Interview, supra note 70 (“[I]n the United States to a 
large degree, and in other Western countries, the basic elements of society have been so heavily 
fiscalized through contractual obligations . . . .”), with DAVID HARVEY, A BRIEF HISTORY OF 
NEOLIBERALISM 2 (2005) (defining a neoliberal state and society as “an institutional framework 
characterized by strong private property rights, free markets, and free trade”). 
 128. See, e.g., WikiLeaks:Strategy, supra note 116 (dismissing the “merely superficial 
democracy” offered by American politics and “the US promise of neocorporatism (better 
shopping)”); see also Manne, supra note 12, at 27 (“[Assange] regards power in western society 
as belonging to political and economic elites offering a counterfeit conception of democracy 
and a soul-destroying consumption culture. He points out that when the American colonists 
waged their struggle for independence there was no talk of shopping or even democracy. Such 
shallow ideas could not stir the passions.”). 
 129. Julian Assange Answers Your Questions, supra note 126; see also Time’s Julian Assange 
Interview, supra note 70 (stating that in fiscalized countries like the United States, “political 
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contrast, disclosure is more likely to affect the state and its citizens. In this 
environment, the disclosure of state actions might spur citizens to revolt; 
indeed, these states’ active censorship betrays their fear of dissenting 
political speech, especially if buoyed by disclosure of their secrets.130 The 
stakes of disclosure’s effects rise, in other words, for states that are less 
“fiscalized” and more explicitly authoritarian and secretive.131 This 
distinction matters to both of Assange’s theories: reform and radical change 
will each be more difficult to accomplish in Western democracies, where 
political change seems not to affect the underlying political economy, than, 
for example, in China, where a challenge to state authority can lead both to 
state reforms and revolution.132 Disclosure will still have effects, in other 
words, but these effects will vary across nations and across time. 
III.  DISCLOSURE’S EFFECTS: WIKILEAKS IN LAW AND ACTION 
Laws regulating public access to government information rely upon a 
balance between the presumed necessity that the state may keep some 
information secret and the equally presumed necessity that the public must 
have access to government information.133 WikiLeaks, whose theories of 
disclosure are based on the latter and ignore the former, profoundly 
challenges this balance. As the Bank Julius Baer episode illustrated,134 
WikiLeaks’ vigilante disclosures—released via immediate, relatively costless, 
and seemingly unstoppable digital distribution, and made more formidable 
by the threat that they will serve as a model for others—strain the hold that 
the U.S. (and all nation states) has over the flow of classified government 
information. The state can criminally prosecute WikiLeaks’ members and 
others postdisclosure, but in doing so it must suffer disclosure’s effects—
effects that transparency as a concept and set of legal doctrines assumes can 
be at least roughly predicted and measured. 
That assumption, one that WikiLeaks itself shares, is the subject of this 
Part. The first section proceeds by describing the balancing test in general, 
and the second section briefly summarizes the most prominent law that 
 
change doesn’t seem to result in economic change, which in other words means that political 
change doesn’t result in change”). The concept seems also to concern class and ownership of 
the means of production. See, e.g., Obrist, supra note 26 (“[I]t doesn’t matter what information 
is published. It’s not going to change who owns what or who controls what.”). 
 130. See Julian Assange Answers Your Questions, supra note 126 (“In states like China, there is 
pervasive censorship, because speech still has power and power is scared of it.”); Time’s Julian 
Assange Interview, supra note 70 (“[J]ournalism and writing are capable of achieving change [in 
China], and that is why Chinese authorities are so scared of it.”). 
 131. Julian Assange Answers Your Questions, supra note 126; Time’s Julian Assange Interview, 
supra note 70. 
 132. Time’s Julian Assange Interview, supra note 70 (“[J]ournalism and writing are capable of 
achieving change [in China], and that is why Chinese authorities are so scared of it.”). 
 133. See Mark Fenster, The Opacity of Transparency, 91 IOWA L. REV. 885, 910–14 (2006). 
 134. See supra text accompanying notes 55–59. 
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would apply to WikiLeaks—prosecution under the Espionage Act for the 
release of classified national-security information and a First Amendment 
claim in defense. Transparency’s balance requires courts to presume both 
the executive branch’s ability to manage and classify information correctly 
and courts’ ability to fairly and accurately weigh the competing interests 
between secrecy and disclosure. The third section sketches out what we 
know, at the time of this writing, about the effects that WikiLeaks’ 
disclosures have had. Neither of this Part’s latter two sections is intended as 
an authoritative statement of a complex set of laws and events relating to 
WikiLeaks; rather, the two sections work together to deduce the legal 
standards that our prevailing theory of transparency has established and to 
note the extent to which those standards’ incoherence and the impossibility 
of a meaningful application are revealed by the challenge WikiLeaks 
presents. 
A.  TRANSPARENCY’S BALANCE 
As a theoretical concept, “transparency” weighs two sets of opposing, 
mutually exclusive interests. On the one hand, theories of transparency 
emphasize the normative democratic ideal of a deliberative, engaged public 
and the consequentialist ideal of a responsible, accountable government 
that will result from a visible state;135 on the other hand, transparency 
theories in the American context also recognize the normative 
constitutional ideal of a tripartite system in which a semiautonomous 
President can perform his delegated duties without the interference of 
Congress and the judiciary (who are themselves free from executive branch 
interference), as well as the consequentialist ideal of an effective, efficient 
state that can protect the nation and public from external and internal 
threats by controlling access to its own deliberations and to sensitive 
information.136 Easy cases raise few issues to balance: the disclosure of 
advanced military technologies, current troop movements and similar 
operative war plans, and the identities of intelligence sources all pose such 
clear and immediate dangers to the state that the law requires no balancing. 
In difficult cases, however, the resulting dualism between transparency’s 
costs and benefits invites an endless struggle over transparency and its 
limitations, as the thrust of powerful arguments in favor of broad disclosure 
requirements continually meet the parry of powerful counterclaims for 
limitations on disclosure. 
The laws that flow from this conceptual coupling recognize broad rights 
and duties for openness and limit them with exceptions from disclosure that 
are frequently read broadly by the executive branch and judiciary, especially 
when the government can make a plausible claim that disclosure would 
 
 135. Fenster, supra note 133, at 895–902. 
 136. Id. at 902–10. 
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place national security, law enforcement, or individual privacy at risk. The 
constitutional doctrine of executive privilege, for example, protects 
communications between the President and his advisers from disclosure, but 
courts must balance that privilege against competing political, legal, and 
social concerns that require the release of information.137 Statutory 
disclosure requirements share this approach. In enacting FOIA, Congress 
attempted to establish a “general” or “broad” philosophy of openness while 
respecting “certain equally important rights” and “opposing interests” that 
are difficult but “not . . . impossible” to balance.138 It tried to set a framework 
for courts to achieve this balance by establishing a series of enumerated 
exemptions to disclosure requirements that would allow some types of 
information to remain outside of the public’s view.139 Conflicts between 
disclosure and secrecy are thus resolved in difficult cases by the 
administrative and judicial application of statutory provisions or regulations 
that call for adjudicators either to explicitly balance the two interests or to 
enforce statutes that incorporate this balance in their structure. 
Like all efforts to balance abstract ideals and goals in constitutional and 
public law, laws regulating the disclosure of public information attempt to 
require the state to evaluate these competing interests carefully and weigh 
them comparatively. Critics complain that balancing tests applied by courts 
constitute an adjudicatory evasion—a judicial “method” that refuses 
principled rules in favor of an inappropriate and unprincipled weighing of 
abstract, indeterminate interests that are fundamentally incom-
mensurable.140 Their ad hoc nature makes them vulnerable to the whim and 
ideology of the judiciary; the results that they produce can seem precarious, 
random, and even idiosyncratic. They transform the judiciary into an 
explicitly political actor that resolves fundamental and contested questions 
of social policy.141 At the same time, as they age, balancing tests appear to 
become routine and even mindless—a rote process by which interests are 
 
 137. See, e.g., Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 452–53 (1977) (citing the need 
to realize the public benefits of preserving the former presidents’ archival materials for 
legitimate historical and government purposes); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 711–12 
(1974) (citing the need for the “fair administration of . . . justice” to criminal defendants). 
 138. EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 80 n.6 (1973) (quoting S. REP. NO. 89-813, at 3 (1965)). 
 139. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1)–(7) (2006). Some exceptions to balancing exist, especially 
where Congress has universally exempted certain types of documents by rule. See § 552(b)(3) 
(exempting matter that is “specifically exempted from disclosure by statute” under certain 
conditions); Jennifer LaFleur et al., FOIA (b)(3) Exemptions, PROPUBLICA (Mar. 10, 2010), 
http://projects.propublica.org/foia-exemptions/ (interactive list of (b)(3) exemptions, with 
information about how frequently agencies rely on them in refusing disclosure). 
 140. See Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enters., Inc., 486 U.S. 888, 897 (1988) (Scalia, 
J., concurring in the judgment); Paul W. Kahn, The Court, the Community and the Judicial Balance: 
The Jurisprudence of Justice Powell, 97 YALE L.J. 1, 4–5 (1987). 
 141. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 943, 
984–86 (1987). 
FENSTER_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/13/2012  1:36 PM 
784 IOWA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 97:753 
invoked but rarely considered in any meaningful way.142 Such complaints 
assert that balancing tests operate without clear conceptual grounding. They 
are inadequate efforts to resolve foundational metaphysical disputes. 
But they exist for a reason. In areas of law where no consensus exists 
among legislators, courts, and the public about a preferable rule, a 
reasonably effective balancing test may at least correctly identify the interests 
for courts to balance and the means to evaluate those interests, even if it 
remains imperfect and imprecise.143 In some instances, those who interpret 
constitutional provisions or draft laws or regulations may understandably 
prefer to devise a balancing test than to construct clear-sounding, 
mechanical-seeming doctrines. Viewed this way, balancing tests’ imprecision 
and “ad hockery” may either be an optimal method or the best of a series of 
unsatisfactory approaches to resolve difficult disputes. 
The arguments in balancing tests’ favor explain why the various 
constitutional and statutory legal regimes that regulate disclosure of 
government information seem inevitably to balance the contested normative 
and consequential elements of transparency theory. If these elements 
cannot be resolved in the abstract, then a doctrine needed to adjudicate 
complex disputes must at least appear as though it can do so, even if it fails 
to satisfy those who lose an individual case as well as those who long for a 
permanent solution consistent with their preferences. As explained in the 
next section by using the example of legal efforts to stop WikiLeaks, the 
measure that transparency laws most typically use to weigh interests 
considers disclosure’s anticipated effects. The issue in this context, then, is 
whether balancing tests’ logic as a means to resolve contested political issues 
can be satisfactorily applied when reduced and made operational through 
the method of anticipating and evaluating disclosure’s effects as a means to 
determine legal outcomes. 
B.  THE CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM, THE ESPIONAGE ACT, AND DISCLOSURE’S EFFECTS 
The classification system provides the taxonomic logic for the federal 
government’s protection of highly sensitive information. It works merely as 
an administrative organizational process, rather than as a basis for criminal 
or civil liability,144 although any prosecution of individuals who misuse or 
disclose such classified information without authority will inevitably build on 
the information’s classification. The potential liability for disclosure agents 
like WikiLeaks thus begins with the classification system and the implicit 
assumptions it makes about information’s inherent power to harm. 
 
 142. See Pierre Schlag, Commentary, The Aesthetics of American Law, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1047, 
1080 (2002). 
 143. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Supreme Court, 1996 Term—Foreword: Implementing the 
Constitution, 111 HARV. L. REV. 54, 82–83 (1997). 
 144. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13,526, supra note 6, § 4.1 (outlining the general restrictions 
on access to classified documents but providing no penalties for violations). 
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The government has long sought to restrict access to particular types of 
information, especially those related to national security.145 The current 
bureaucratic system, with its various levels of classification and employee 
access to it, dates to the Cold War-era expansion of the military, the 
intelligence agencies, and those agencies overseeing the production and 
regulation of nuclear energy.146 Beginning in 1940, nearly every President 
has issued an executive order that establishes the somewhat different 
approach each administration has taken to classification.147 The 
classification system works by a relatively simple logic and process. A 
document is “classified” by level based on the anticipated effects of its 
unauthorized disclosure. The three levels are defined in the current 
executive order as follows: “‘Top Secret’ shall be applied to information, the 
unauthorized disclosure of which reasonably could be expected to cause 
exceptionally grave damage to the national security”; “[s]ecret” information 
could reasonably be expected to “cause serious damage” if disclosed without 
authorization; and “[c]onfidential” information could reasonably be 
expected simply to “cause damage” if disclosed without authorization.148 
Individuals are sorted in two ways: first, by their authority to classify, based 
upon a direct delegation of such authority or their location within the 
organizational chart of the agency in which they are located;149 and second, 
by the extent of their access to particular levels of classified documents, 
based on their authorization (or “clearance”) to have access and their need 
to know the information.150 Those with the authority to classify must be 
trained to evaluate the effects of disclosure;151 those with access to classified 
information are those whom the government has decided will not endanger 
the national security as a result of their access.152 
The system thus appears to offer a mechanical means to segregate 
communicative documents both within the federal bureaucracy and from 
those outside it. It quarantines the most threatening information through 
measures that increase security as the classification level proceeds upward 
 
 145. Richard C. Ehlke & Harold C. Relyea, The Reagan Administration Order on Security 
Classification: A Critical Assessment, 30 FED. B. NEWS & J. 91, 91–92 (1983). 
 146. See JAMES RUSSELL WIGGINS, FREEDOM OR SECRECY 99–103 (rev. ed. 1964); Ehlke & 
Relyea, supra note 145, at 92–93. 
 147. See ARVIN S. QUIST, SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION: INTRODUCTION, 
HISTORY, AND ADVERSE IMPACTS ch. 3 (rev. ed. 2002), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/ 
library/quist/chap_3.html; see, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13,526, supra note 6 (currently applicable 
executive order issued by President Obama). 
 148. Exec. Order No. 13,526, supra note 6, § 1.2(a)(1)–(3) (emphasis added). 
 149. Id. § 1.3(a), (d) (defining classification authority); id. § 2.1 (defining “derivative” 
classification authority). 
 150. Id. § 4.1 (defining general restrictions on access to classified documents). 
 151. See id. § 1.3(d) (requiring training of those with original classification authority). 
 152. See id. §§ 1.3(a), 2.1. 
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toward “Top Secret.”153 FOIA, in turn, secures classified documents from 
disclosure to the public until such time as they are declassified.154 As the 
Director of Classification Management for the Department of Defense 
declared in the first article in the first issue of the journal Classification 
Management (the publication of the then-newly formed National 
Classification Management Society) in 1965, “[t]he single most important 
function of central management is considered to be to achieve uniform, 
consistent, and correct classifications in the first instance.”155 
It is unclear if the new class of professional information managers of the 
journal ever met such lofty goals. But there is broad consensus that the 
classification system is currently a mess and has been for decades.156 Too 
many documents are classified, securing those documents is too costly, and 
the classification system resists reform; at the same time, various military and 
intelligence agencies, and the presidential administrations that oversee 
them, allow—or even encourage—the expansion of classification authority 
throughout the bureaucracy and an increase in the number of classified 
documents.157 A full accounting of the system’s history and operations, as 
well as the efforts to reform it, is well beyond the scope of this Article.158 
Instead, I simply want to note that the classification system constitutes a form 
of information control—or, as Daniel Moynihan characterized it, 
informational regulation159—through which the executive branch and its 
 
 153. See id. § 1.2(a). 
 154. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1) (2006) (exempting from disclosure under FOIA documents that 
are “specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to be kept secret in 
the interest of national defense or foreign policy and . . . are in fact properly classified pursuant 
to such Executive order”); Exec. Order No. 13,526, supra note 6, § 1.5 (providing time limits 
for the duration of classification); id. §§ 3.1–.7 (discussing the process of declassification). 
Information that is not classified (or declassified) does not fall within one exemption from 
disclosure under FOIA, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1), although it may fall within another exemption or 
be made exempt from disclosure under another statute. 
 155. George MacClain, The Road Ahead, in 1 CLASSIFICATION MGMT. 6, 6 (1965), available at 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/library/ncms/v1n1.pdf. 
 156. See Steven Aftergood, Reducing Government Secrecy: Finding What Works, 27 YALE L. & 
POL’Y REV. 399, 399–401 (2009) (discussing the current state of the classification system). 
 157. S. DOC. NO. 105-2, at 1–2 (1997); Too Many Secrets: Overclassification as a Barrier to 
Critical Information Sharing: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Nat’l Sec., Emerging Threats & Int’l 
Relations of the H. Comm. on Gov’t Reform, 108th Cong. 23 (2004), available at http://www.gpo. 
gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-108hhrg98291/pdf/CHRG-108hhrg98291.pdf (statement of J. William 
Leonard, Director, Information Security Oversight Office, National Archives and Records 
Administration) (conceding that “[i]t is no secret that the government classifies too much 
information” and complaining that “some individual agencies have no idea how much 
information they generate is classified”); see also Meredith Fuchs, Judging Secrets: The Role Courts 
Should Play in Preventing Unnecessary Secrecy, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 131, 133–34 (2006). 
 158. For fuller discussions, see Aftergood, supra note 156, at 401–11; Mary-Rose Papandrea, 
Lapdogs, Watchdogs, and Scapegoats: The Press and National Security Information, 83 IND. L.J. 233, 
240–43 (2008); Christina E. Wells, Information Control in Times of Crisis: The Tools of Repression, 30 
OHIO N.U. L. REV. 451, 452–61 (2004). 
 159. DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN, SECRECY: THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 59 (1998). 
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myriad agencies with classification authority attempt to keep documents 
secret. Using their loosely delegated authority to classify, agency 
bureaucracies operate within a system of secret production that Edward Shils 
described as “the compulsory withholding of knowledge, reinforced by the 
prospect of sanctions for disclosure.”160 Significantly, the withholding of 
knowledge (as well as, derivatively, sanctions for willfully revealing that 
information) is based upon the prediction, by duly authorized government 
employees, of disclosure’s effects. 
The most prominent criminal law prohibiting the dissemination of 
classified information is the Espionage Act of 1917,161 which criminalizes or 
prohibits dissemination by those with or without lawful possession and access 
to the information.162 The statute appears to sweep broadly to impose 
criminal sanctions on disclosure,163 but it is inherently limited in its 
application by First Amendment protections for free speech and a free 
press.164 Together, the broad criminal sanctions against disclosure and the 
broad constitutional protections against state efforts to limit speech require 
courts to ask whether, in the words of Geoffrey Stone’s recent restatement of 
the law, “the value of the disclosure to informed public deliberation 
outweigh[s] its danger to the national security.”165 Stone’s balance 
metaphor/method reflects the general judicial approach.166 He undertakes 
 
 160. EDWARD A. SHILS, THE TORMENT OF SECRECY: THE BACKGROUND AND CONSEQUENCES 
OF AMERICAN SECURITY POLICIES 26 (Ivan R. Dee 1996) (1956). 
 161. Act of June 15, 1917, ch. 30, 40 Stat. 217 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 793–
94 (2006)). Other statutes might also apply in individual cases. For comprehensive discussions 
of the full statutory framework, see Papandrea, supra note 158, at 274–77; Stephen I. Vladeck, 
Inchoate Liability and the Espionage Act: The Statutory Framework and the Freedom of the Press, 1 HARV. 
L. & POL’Y REV. 219, 228–31 (2007). 
 162. 18 U.S.C. § 793(d)–(e). 
 163. Sections 793(d) and (e) of the Espionage Act both create criminal liability for anyone 
who either lawfully possesses or otherwise obtains information related to the national defense 
and who 
willfully communicates, delivers, transmits or causes to be communicated, 
delivered, or transmitted or attempts to communicate, deliver, transmit or cause to 
be communicated, delivered or transmitted the same to any person not entitled to 
receive it, or willfully retains the same and fails to deliver it on demand to the 
officer or employee of the United States entitled to receive it. 
§ 793(d); § 793(e) (using nearly identical language). 
 164. U.S. CONST. amend. I, cl. 2. 
 165. STONE, supra note 3, at 2. 
 166. The balance metaphor appeared in the most recent reported decision in a criminal 
prosecution under the Espionage Act, where the court summarized the key issue in evaluating a 
First Amendment defense: 
Defendants’ First Amendment challenge exposes the inherent tension between the 
government transparency so essential to a democratic society and the 
government’s equally compelling need to protect from disclosure information that 
could be used by those who wish this nation harm. In addressing this tension, it is 
important to bear in mind that the question to be resolved here is not whether 
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a heroic effort to sort the fine grains that belong on each side of the scale, 
providing a roadmap that purports to bring a somewhat complicated order 
to an unwieldy and underdeveloped set of doctrines.167 Nevertheless, 
balancing two utterly vague, incommensurate legal standards is at best a 
speculative undertaking—as the seminal scholarly treatment of the 
Espionage Act published nearly forty years ago described the effort, “[A]d 
hoc evaluations of executive claims of risk are not easily balanced against 
first amendment language and gloss.”168 
Nevertheless, courts must try. The balancing approach requires courts 
to evaluate and balance claims about national security dangers, the 
unknown consequences of censoring the defendant (including chilling 
investigative journalism and whistle-blowing), and the risk to a democratic 
system of an uninformed public. They must comprehend and anticipate the 
risks created by the defendant’s disclosure and imagine a counterfactual 
world in which the disclosure did not exist. They must, in sum, estimate 
disclosure’s unknowable effects without the omnipotence either to isolate 
the effects that have occurred or to predict future ones. 
C.  WIKILEAKS’ UNCERTAIN EFFECTS 
The complex nature of the WikiLeaks disclosures, as well as the 
international geopolitical world through which they have flowed, 
demonstrates the impossibility of exercising such omniscience in 
determining their effects in hard cases. It is difficult, if not impossible, to 
find any clear or meaningful pattern of effects caused by such a broad set of 
documents that would help determine whether the balance of interests tips 
in favor of secrecy or disclosure. In addition, the presence or absence now of 
relatively short-term effects does not preclude the later manifestation of 
long-term effects or the disappearance of earlier impacts. Below, I briefly 
identify and evaluate five potential effects that have been discussed 
extensively by government officials and commentators and reported on by 
the press and in other open sources. Three concern the state’s interest, as 
 
[the Espionage Act] is the optimal resolution of this tension, but whether 
Congress, in passing this statute, has struck a balance between these competing 
interests that falls within the range of constitutionally permissible outcomes. 
United States v. Rosen, 445 F. Supp. 2d 602, 629 (E.D. Va. 2006). As Justice Frankfurter 
characterized this balance more generally in an oft-cited passage: 
The demands of free speech in a democratic society as well as the interest in 
national security are better served by a candid and informed weighing of the 
competing interests, within the confines of the judicial process, than by 
announcing dogmas too inflexible for the non-Euclidian problems to be solved. 
Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 524–25 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
 167. STONE, supra note 3. 
 168. Harold Edgar & Benno C. Schmidt, Jr., The Espionage Statutes and Publication of Defense 
Information, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 929, 932 (1973). 
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recognized in the transparency balancing test, in limiting the adverse effects 
of disclosure: (1) the claim that the disclosures cost the lives of American 
military personnel and of their allies in Iraq and Afghanistan; (2) the claim 
that they will affect diplomatic relations between the U.S. and other nations; 
and (3) the claim that they will harm the flow of information among units of 
the American military, intelligence agencies, and State Department. The 
other two potential effects concern the public interest in disclosure: (4) the 
claim—rarely made explicitly, interestingly enough—that the disclosures 
have enlightened and enlivened the American public; and (5) the claim that 
they have played significant roles in inspiring or encouraging the 
democratic movements in North Africa and the Middle East to overthrow 
long-standing corrupt and authoritarian rulers. I consider these in turn. 
One final note: It is quite possible that what follows excludes evidence 
that would lead to a certain conclusion; it is equally possible that it does not 
account for effects that themselves have been classified for some strategic or 
military purpose.169 My goal, however, is not to persuade the reader that my 
own uncertain conclusions about these effects are correct. Rather, it is to 
persuade you that any conclusion about disclosure’s strong effects, whether 
good or bad, is likely to be—and ought to be—contentious. The government 
can and will claim that disclosure is dangerous, and transparency advocates 
can and will claim that disclosure is beneficial. At least to date, based on a 
review of open sources, both claims about WikiLeaks appear tendentious at 
best. 
1.  WikiLeaks’ Direct Effects on Military Operations 
Military officials made numerous allegations in the aftermath of the 
Afghanistan releases about the immediate and likely future effects of the 
disclosures on American military operations.170 The allegations seemed 
 
 169. See LEIGH & HARDING, supra note 12, at 8–10 (noting the complexity of evaluating the 
harms and benefits of WikiLeaks releases). 
 170. Immediately after the first major document release regarding Afghanistan, the 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff declared that “Mr. Assange can say whatever he likes about 
the greater good he thinks he and his source are doing . . . . But the truth is they might already 
have on their hands the blood of some young soldier or that of an Afghan family.” Greg Jaffe & 
Joshua Partlow, Joint Chiefs Chairman Mullen: WikiLeaks Release Endangers Troops, Afghans, WASH. 
POST (July 30, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/07/29/ 
AR2010072904900.html (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Admiral Mike Mullen, 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff). Less than a week later, the Pentagon press secretary 
stated in a press conference that WikiLeaks “has already threatened the safety of our troops, our 
allies and Afghan citizens who are working with us to help bring about peace and stability in 
that part of the world.” DOD News Briefing with Geoff Morrell from the Pentagon, U.S. DEP’T OF  
DEF. (Aug. 5, 2010), http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=53001 
(transcript of press conference by former Pentagon press secretary Geoff Morrell). Military 
officials continued to press such claims months later. Hearing To Consider the Nominations of: 
Honorable Michael G. Vickers To Be Under Sec’y of Def. for Intelligence; and Dr. Jo Ann Rooney To Be 
Principal Deputy Under Sec’y of Def. for Pers. and Readiness: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Armed 
FENSTER_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/13/2012  1:36 PM 
790 IOWA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 97:753 
reasonable after a Taliban spokesman announced that the organization 
would be using WikiLeaks documents to identify collaborators.171 Then, in a 
joint statement e-mailed to WikiLeaks, five human-rights groups, including 
Amnesty International and the International Crisis Group, complained that 
the release of uncensored Afghanistan documents would endanger their 
operations by disclosing the names of those with whom they worked.172 Such 
claims, which seem to demonstrate that disclosure is creating grave danger 
to innocent human life and to the nation’s military operations, constitute 
the strongest evidence that the state can marshal to demonstrate that 
particular documents must remain secret and that any unauthorized 
disclosure of them must result in criminal prosecution.173 
To date, however, no corroborated incident has come to light 
demonstrating that a document that WikiLeaks released caused significant 
physical damage to American military or diplomatic interests.174 Defense 
Secretary Robert Gates, who complained in July 2010 that WikiLeaks would 
have “potentially dramatic and grievously harmful consequences,”175 
concluded less than three months later that the disclosures did not reveal 
any sensitive intelligence methods or sources.176 Although Gates at that time 
continued to warn about attacks against individuals named in the 
documents, a NATO official interviewed at the same time denied that any 
 
Servs., 112th Cong. (2011), available at http://armed-services.senate.gov/Transcripts/2011/ 
02%20February/11-03%20-%202-15-11.pdf at 10–11 (testimony of acting Under Secretary of 
Defense for Intelligence Michael G. Vickers, agreeing that WikiLeaks’ disclosures endangered 
individuals who were cooperating with the American military and have damaged the military’s 
ability to recruit intelligence assets). 
 171. Ron Moreau & Sami Yousafzai, Taliban Seeks Vengeance in Wake of WikiLeaks, DAILY 
BEAST (Aug. 1, 2010), http://www.newsweek.com/2010/08/02/taliban-seeks-vengeance-in-
wake-of-wikileaks.html. 
 172. Jeanne Whalen, Rights Groups Join Criticism of WikiLeaks, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 9, 2010), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703428604575419580947722558.html. 
 173. See Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 308–09 (1981) (refusing to extend First Amendment 
protection for disclosure of an intelligence operative’s identity); see also Near v. Minnesota, 283 
U.S. 697, 716 (1931) (noting that the First Amendment would not protect disclosure of troop 
movements). 
 174. Robert Burns, Are Risks from WikiLeaks Overstated by Government?, BOSTON.COM (Aug. 17, 
2010), http://www.boston.com/news/nation/washington/articles/2010/08/17/are_risks_from_ 
wikileaks_overstated_by_government/; x7o, Debunked: “Wikileaks Has Blood on Its Hands,” WL 
CENT. (Nov. 21, 2010, 04:47), http://wlcentral.org/node/278; Bradley Klapper & Cassandra 
Vinograd, AP Review Finds No Threatened WikiLeaks Sources, YAHOO! NEWS (Sept. 10, 2011), 
http://news.yahoo.com/ap-review-finds-no-threatened-wikileaks-sources-074530441.html; Deb 
Riechmann, Coalition Informant Plays Both Sides of Afghan War, ABC NEWS (June 7, 2011), http:// 
abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory?id=13779423. 
 175. Charlie Savage, Gates Assails WikiLeaks over Release of Reports, N.Y. TIMES (July 29, 2010), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/30/world/asia/30wiki.html (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 176. Adam Levine, Gates: Leaked Documents Don’t Reveal Key Intel, but Risks Remain, CNN (Oct. 
17, 2010, 8:25 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2010/US/10/16/wikileaks.assessment/index.html? 
hpt=T2. 
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such attacks happened.177 Doubts about WikiLeaks’ direct effects on military 
operations and individual lives cannot erase or remove the threat that such 
effects could occur in the future, but they suggest that the assumption that 
such effects would necessarily follow—assumptions made upon the 
documents’ release by military officials and conservative political figures—
was unwarranted. 
Although I do not want to deny the significance of such threats, 
WikiLeaks at least suggests that the risk of disclosure is just that—a risk that 
should require the government to produce some evidence, and the courts to 
explicitly perform some predictive calculation, before they conclude that 
such threats indeed exist. If courts merely deferred to the state’s bald claims, 
they would not engage in adjudicatory balancing—rather, they would be 
acquiescing to executive prerogative. It is instructive in this context to 
consider what we know about the Pentagon Papers disclosures nearly forty 
years ago. In an important 1981 article, Floyd Abrams interviewed the key 
military witness in the Pentagon Papers case, who had testified about the 
likely dangerous effects that disclosure of the classified documents would 
have on the American military campaign in Vietnam.178 Ten years after the 
disclosures, Vice Admiral Francis J. Blouin, who was then Deputy Chief of 
Naval Operations for Plans and Policy, continued to complain of the 
disclosures’ illegality and harm to the “will of our country” to fight the war, 
but concluded: “I don’t think there was any great loss in substance.”179 No 
matter how one views the suitability of drawing analogies between the 
circumstances surrounding the two events,180 it seems, at present at least, as 
though their effects on military operations (or lack thereof) are fairly 
similar. 
2.  WikiLeaks’ Direct and Indirect Effects on Diplomatic Relations 
The claim that disclosures would affect the State Department and the 
United States’ diplomatic relations with other nations exhibits a similar 
dynamic. On the eve of the diplomatic cables’ release, Harold Koh, the State 
Department’s Legal Adviser, warned Assange in a letter made public that 
WikiLeaks’ planned disclosure violated U.S. law and complained of the 
 
 177. Id. 
 178. Floyd Abrams, The Pentagon Papers a Decade Later, N.Y. TIMES MAG., June 8, 1981, at 22, 
25. See generally N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (popularly known as the 
Pentagon Papers case). 
 179. Abrams, supra note 178, at 25; see also John T. Correll, The Pentagon Papers, AIR FORCE 
MAG., Feb. 2007, at 50, 55, available at http://www.airforce-magazine.com/MagazineArchive/ 
Documents/2007/February%202007/0207pentagon.pdf (observing that the Pentagon Papers 
provided North Vietnam with “rich insights into early US objectives, strategies, uncertainties, 
and degrees of commitment,” but conceding that “their publication appears to have had little 
or no effect on the remaining course of the war” because the documents were several years old 
and focused more on political machinations than on current military strategy). 
 180. See Tofel, supra note 65 (questioning the analogy). 
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certain increased danger that the disclosure of diplomatic cables would 
create for innocent civilians named in the documents, ongoing military 
operations, and cooperation and relations between the United States and 
other nations.181 The State Department also warned hundreds of human-
rights activists, officials of foreign governments, and businesspeople who 
were identified in the diplomatic cables of the threats their identification 
might create for them.182 
Again, however, no clear evidence has come to light of any direct ill 
effects the disclosures have caused. Administration officials have not publicly 
identified any additional harassment that its sources experienced as a result 
of the WikiLeaks disclosures.183 The U.S. ambassador to Mexico was forced 
to resign after the release of cables in which he criticized the Mexican 
government’s efforts to fight drug trafficking,184 but no direct harm has 
 
 181. See Letter from Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep’t of State, to  
Jennifer Robinson, Att’y for Mr. Julian Assange (Nov. 27, 2010) [hereinafter Koh Letter], 
available at http://media.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/documents/Dept_of_State_ 
Assange_letter.pdf. 
 182. Mark Landler & Scott Shane, U.S. Sends Warning to People Named in Cable Leaks, N.Y. 
TIMES (Jan. 6, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/07/world/07wiki.html. 
 183. Id. One episode that commentators identified concerned a cable that indicated 
Zimbabwean opposition leader Morgan Tsvangirai secretly encouraged Western nations, 
through diplomatic channels, to impose sanctions on the Zimbabwean government, led by 
Robert Mugabe, with whom Tsvangirai’s party has a power-sharing arrangement. See 
Christopher R. Albon, How WikiLeaks Just Set Back Democracy in Zimbabwe, ATLANTIC (Dec.  
28, 2010), http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2010/12/how-wikileaks-just-set-
back-democracy-in-zimbabwe/68598/; James Richardson, US Cable Leaks’ Collateral Damage in 
Zimbabwe, GUARDIAN (Jan. 3, 2011), http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/cifamerica/ 
2011/jan/03/zimbabwe-morgan-tsvangirai. In response to the disclosure, the Zimbabwean 
attorney general, whom Mugabe had appointed, announced that his office would investigate 
Tsvangirai on charges of treason, a crime for which he could be executed. See Richardson, 
supra. There are two weaknesses with an effort to describe this episode as a direct, adverse effect 
that WikiLeaks has inflicted upon American diplomatic efforts. First, the cable was published, in 
its entirety, by the Guardian newspaper before it was posted by WikiLeaks—although, but for 
WikiLeaks, the Guardian would not have had access to the cables, and WikiLeaks did publish it 
later. See x7o, 2011-01-04: James Richardson’s Collateral Damage in the Guardian: WikiLeaks & 
Tsvangirai, WL CENT. (Apr. 1, 2011, 02:57), http://wlcentral.org/node/820. Second, Mugabe 
has regularly accused his opposition of treason for years, using any convenient excuse, and has 
attempted to use his control of the country’s prosecutors and newspapers to press those 
charges. See Robert I. Rotberg, Mugabe Doesn’t Need an Excuse, FOREIGN POL’Y (Dec. 28,  
2010), http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/12/28/mugabe_doesnt_need_an_excuse; 
WikiLeaks in Zimbabwe, and in the Media, ZUNGUZUNGU (Jan. 5, 2011, 9:12 AM), http:// 
zunguzungu.wordpress.com/2011/01/05/wikileaks-in-zimbabwe-and-in-the-media/. In July 
2011, the Zimbabwean government announced that Tsvangirai would not be prosecuted. See 
Clemence Manyukwe, WikiLeaks: Tsvangirai Escapes Prosecution, FIN. GAZETTE (July 18, 2011, 
10:57 AM), http://www.financialgazette.co.zw/top-stories/9069-wikileaks-tsvangirai-escapes-
prosecution.html. 
 184. See Jose de Cordoba, U.S. Ambassador to Mexico Resigns Following WikiLeak Flap, WALL ST. 
J. (Mar. 19, 2011), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704021504576211282 
543444242.html. The U.S. ambassador to Mexico was not the only diplomat who was forced to 
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been traced to the cables, and it is unclear whether the disclosures will have 
any long-term effect on U.S.–Mexico relations.185 
Koh’s letter to Assange also warned of the indirect effects that the 
disclosures would have on diplomatic confidences,186 as did Secretary of 
State Hillary Clinton in a news conference immediately after the cable 
release began.187 As a result, this claim also asserts that internal 
communications between U.S. diplomats and the State Department will be 
less forthright for fear of later exposure, and foreign sources will be less 
likely to disclose information or share opinions with American diplomats for 
fear that the U.S. will be unable to protect its statements and identities from 
disclosure.188 This claim concerns marginal, though perhaps significant, 
effects on diplomatic discourse and deliberation as engaged in by 
participants; as such, it is not one for which evidence can easily be 
marshaled except through the statements of those who are current or 
former State Department employees.189 Nevertheless, courts tend to defer to 
such claims made by the executive branch regarding information about 
national security and diplomatic efforts.190 
 
resign or was reassigned as a result of leaked cables. See LEIGH & HARDING, supra note 12, at 
225. 
 185. Mexican president Felipe Calderon pushed for the ambassador’s firing, claiming that 
the cables harmed U.S.–Mexico relations, but it is unclear whether his efforts reflected his 
sincere conclusion about the disclosure’s effects or if instead they were aimed at a domestic 
audience as he prepared for a contested reelection campaign in 2012. See de Cordoba, supra 
note 184; Mary Beth Sheridan, Calderon: WikiLeaks Caused Severe Damage to U.S.–Mexico Relations, 
WASH. POST (Mar. 3, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/ 
2011/03/03/AR2011030302853.html. 
 186. See Koh Letter, supra note 181. 
 187. See Remarks to the Press on Release of Purportedly Confidential Documents by Wikileaks, U.S. 
DEP’T OF STATE (Nov. 29, 2010), http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/11/152078.htm 
(transcript of press conference by Secretary Clinton in which she complains that WikiLeaks 
“undermines our efforts to work with other countries to solve shared problems” and 
characterizes the leaks as attacking “the international community—the alliances and 
partnerships, the conversations and negotiations, that safeguard global security and advance 
economic prosperity”); see also Clinton Condemns Leak as “Attack on International Community,” CNN 
(Nov. 29, 2010), http://articles.cnn.com/2010-11-29/us/wikileaks_1_julian-assange-wikileaks-
disclosure?_s=PM:US (reporting on Secretary Clinton’s press conference). 
 188. See George Packer, The Right to Secrecy, NEW YORKER (Nov. 29, 2010), http:// 
www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/georgepacker/2010/11/the-right-to-secrecy.html; James P. 
Rubin, The Irony of WikiLeaks, NEW REPUBLIC (Dec. 1, 2010), http://www.tnr.com/ 
article/politics/79531/the-irony-wikileaks-american-diplomacy-hard-left. 
 189. See, e.g., Samuel Witten, The Effects of WikiLeaks on Those Who Work at the State Department, 
OPINIO JURIS (Dec. 18, 2010, 5:49 PM), http://opiniojuris.org/2010/12/18/the-effects-of-
wikileaks-on-those-who-work-at-the-state-department/ (providing an extensive discussion of the 
effects of WikiLeaks on State Department employees by a former deputy legal adviser and 
principal deputy assistant secretary of state for population, refugees, and migration). 
 190. See, e.g., United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 10 (1953) (stating that government can 
protect information under the state-secrets doctrine if it can show “there is a reasonable danger 
that compulsion of the evidence will expose military matters which, in the interest of national 
security, should not be divulged”). Under FOIA, courts give “substantial weight” to government 
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But to say that courts are willing to defer to claims of anticipated effects 
made by the executive branch is not the same as concluding that such effects 
in fact occur. This distinction is significant because later statements by 
cabinet secretaries have suggested that these effects may not have occurred 
and may not be expected to occur in the future. In a news conference soon 
after the start of the diplomatic-cable disclosures, Secretary Gates 
confidently declared that the releases would have little effect on diplomatic 
relations,191 and a few days later, Secretary Clinton also significantly 
downplayed her concerns after she attended an Organization for Security 
and Cooperation in Europe (“OSCE”) meeting where she spoke with 
foreign leaders who assured her that diplomatic relations would continue as 
before.192 Several commentators even hypothesized that the cables’ release 
might in fact improve diplomatic relations, insofar as they revealed the 
similarity between the United States’ public and private statements,  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
officials’ affidavits regarding the threats to national security that agencies foresee if they are 
forced to disclose requested documents; under these circumstances, FOIA exemptions 1 (for 
properly classified information) and 3 (for information specifically exempted by Congress in 
other statutes) apply. See Halperin v. CIA, 629 F.2d 144, 148 (D.C. Cir. 1980). On judicial 
deference to executive branch claims of national security, see David E. Pozen, Deep Secrecy, 62 
STAN. L. REV. 257, 304–05 (2010), and James R. Ferguson, Government Secrecy After the Cold War: 
The Role of Congress, 34 B.C. L. REV. 451, 452 (1993) (decrying the Supreme Court’s “reluctance 
to evaluate the factual basis of secrecy claims in foreign policy” and complaining that the Court 
“largely has withdrawn from any significant role in determining the proper limits of 
government secrecy”). 
 191. DOD News Briefing with Secretary Gates and Adm. Mullen from the Pentagon, U.S. DEP’T OF 
DEF. (Nov. 30, 2010), http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4728 
[hereinafter Gates News Briefing] (transcript of press conference). But see Marc Ambinder, 
WikiLeaks Did “Significant Damage” to Diplomacy, State Official Says, NAT’L J. (Dec. 1, 2010), 
http://www.nationaljournal.com/whitehouse/wikileaks-did-significant-damage-to-diplomacy-state-
official-says-20101201 (quoting an anonymous State Department official disagreeing with 
Secretary Gates’s statement, stating that the disclosures are “going to complicate U.S. diplomacy 
and international cooperation for a long time after the headlines stop”). 
 192. Clinton: WikiLeaks Won’t Hurt U.S. Diplomacy, CBS NEWS (Dec. 2, 2010), http://www. 
cbsnews.com/stories/2010/12/01/world/main7105891.shtml (quoting Secretary Clinton as 
saying that at the OSCE meeting, “I have not . . . had any concerns expressed about whether any 
nation will not continue to work with and discuss matters of importance to us both going 
forward”); see also LEIGH & HARDING, supra note 12, at 245–46 (describing the State 
Department’s retreat from its complaints about WikiLeaks’ dire effects). 
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increasing American diplomats’ credibility193—a sentiment echoed in part 
by Defense Secretary Gates.194 
If taken seriously, the interest in preventing the adverse “effects” on 
diplomacy makes little sense if it needs to be calibrated in any meaningful 
way. By their initial statements about disclosure’s certain effects, Secretary of 
State Clinton and Legal Advisor Koh made plain that they strongly preferred 
that the cables not be disclosed, at least in the manner and at the time that 
WikiLeaks disclosed them. But their preferences do not reveal whether 
those disclosures actually affected or will affect American diplomatic 
interests, nor do they prove, by themselves, that the risks of their disclosure 
outweigh the gain.195 And again, to the extent that the Pentagon Papers 
provides any historical guide, the deputy under secretary of state who 
testified in the New York Times litigation that the disclosures made 
confidential diplomacy impossible ten years later conceded that the Court’s 
decision in the newspapers’ favor was “probably” correct and that abstract 
free-press values were more important than the harms to diplomatic efforts 
claimed by State Department officials.196 
3.  WikiLeaks’ Effects on Intra-Governmental Information Sharing 
After the WikiLeaks disclosures, government agencies reviewed their 
use of classified databases and began to implement various security measures 
to prevent future leaks.197 The measures that drew the most attention were 
 
 193. See Hamish Barwick, WikiLeaks a Boon for US Government: Former Obama Campaign 
Adviser, COMPUTERWORLD (June 8, 2011), http://www.computerworld.com.au/article/389459/ 
wikileaks_boon_us_government_former_obama_campaign_adviser/; Gideon Rachman, America 
Should Give Assange a Medal, FIN. TIMES (Dec. 13, 2010), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/61f8fab0-
06f3-11e0-8c29-00144feabdc0,s01=1.html; James Traub, The Sunshine Policy, FOREIGN POL’Y 
(Dec. 10, 2010), http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/12/10/the_sunshine_policy. 
This observation has been shared by at least one assistant secretary of state. See Internet Freedom: 
Promoting Human Rights in the Digital Age—A Panel Discussion, U.S. SEC’Y OF STATE (Mar. 4, 2011), 
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/rm/2011/162490.htm (quoting Assistant Secretary of State 
Michael Posner, who, after complaining about the disclosures, proudly stated that “one of the 
salutary aspects [of the diplomatic-cable disclosures] is it does reveal the inner workings of a 
government that’s actually paying attention to human rights every day”). 
 194. Gates News Briefing, supra note 191. 
 195. See, e.g., Editorial, WikiLeaks and the Diplomats, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 29, 2010), http://www. 
nytimes.com/2010/11/30/opinion/30tue1.html (noting the need for diplomatic privilege 
over communications but concluding that “[t]he documents are valuable because they 
illuminate American policy in a way that Americans and others deserve to see”). 
 196. Abrams, supra note 178, at 72. 
 197. Jim Garamone, Officials Condemn Leaks, Detail Prevention Efforts, U.S. DEP’T DEF. (Nov. 
28, 2010), http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=61861; Adam Levine, Previous 
WikiLeaks Release Forced Tighter Security for U.S. Military, CNN (Nov. 28, 2010), http:// 
articles.cnn.com/2010-11-28/us/wikileaks.security_1_documents-security-gaps-computer-system?_s 
=PM:US; Ellen Nakashima & Jerry Markon, WikiLeaks Founder Could Be Charged Under Espionage 
Act, WASH. POST (Nov. 30, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/ 
2010/11/29/AR2010112905973.html; Roberts, supra note 12, at 21–24. 
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those involving information sharing between federal agencies.198 The 
National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States 
(“Commission” or “9/11 Commission”) had denounced organizational 
stovepipes that had developed within units of agencies and across agencies—
that is, bureaucratic and technological impediments to the flow of 
information going out of and coming into agencies, resulting in units that 
did not have current or sufficient information to perform their tasks—and, 
the Commission concluded, that contributed to the failure of 
counterterrorism agencies to prevent the 9/11 attacks.199 Without access to 
documents obtained or developed by one agency, employees and units 
working on similar or related projects were uninformed about the 
development of the terrorist threat.200 In a post-9/11 response, agencies 
began to take concerted steps to make information relevant to 
counterterrorism efforts available throughout the federal government.201 In 
the wake of the WikiLeaks disclosures, many both within and outside the 
government charged that the effort to share information had left data 
networks insecure and classified information vulnerable to theft and 
leaking.202 WikiLeaks’ alleged source for its major U.S. leaks, Pfc. Bradley 
Manning, apparently downloaded the video and document caches that he 
 
 198. See, e.g., Christopher Beam, Unfair Share, SLATE (Nov. 29, 2010, 6:07 PM), 
http://www.slate.com/id/2276188/; Joseph Straw, WikiLeaks’ Information-Sharing Fallout,  
SECURITY MGMT., http://www.securitymanagement.com/article/wikileaks-information-sharing-
fallout-008244 (last visited Dec. 24, 2011); Sean Reilly, WikiLeaks Fallout Leads to an Info-Sharing 
Clampdown, FED. TIMES (Dec. 5, 2010), http://www.federaltimes.com/article/20101205/IT03/ 
12050306/. 
 199. NAT’L COMM’N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S., THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 
419–23 (authorized ed. 2004). 
 200. Massimo Calabresi, State Pulls the Plug on SIPRNet, SWAMPLAND (Nov. 29, 2010), http:// 
swampland.time.com/2010/11/29/state-pulls-the-plug-on-siprnet/; Felix Stalder, Contain This! 
Leaks, Whistle-Blowers and the Networked News Ecology, EUROZINE (Nov. 29, 2010), http://www. 
eurozine.com/pdf/2010-11-29-stalder-en.pdf; Joby Warrick, WikiLeaks Cable Dump Reveals Flaws 
of State Department’s Information-Sharing Tool, WASH. POST (Dec. 31, 2010), http://www. 
washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/12/30/AR2010123004962.html. 
 201. See, e.g., What Is ISE?, INFO. SHARING ENV’T, http://ise.gov/what-ise (last visited Dec. 
24, 2011) (detailing organization built from defense, intelligence, homeland security, foreign 
affairs, and law enforcement agencies in order to “provide[] analysts, operators, and 
investigators with integrated and synthesized terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, and 
homeland security information needed to enhance national security and help keep our people 
safe”). 
 202. See, e.g., Phil Stewart, Analysis: WikiLeaks May Set Back U.S. Intelligence Sharing, REUTERS 
(Nov. 29 2010), http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/11/29/us-wikileaks-intelligence-
idUSTRE6AS67F20101129 (“This is a colossal failure by our intel community, by our 
Department of Defense, to keep classified information secret. . . . This database should never 
have been created. Hundreds of thousands of people should not have been provided access to 
it.” (quoting then-U.S. Representative Peter Hoekstra, who at the time was a member of the 
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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passed along to WikiLeaks via the Department of Defense’s SIPRNet 
network, to which he had access.203 
In response to the leaks, the State Department disconnected itself from 
Defense’s SIPRNet, thereby securing its information from potential leaks by 
non-State Department employees and removing the agency from at least 
part of its information-sharing commitment with Defense.204 By inhibiting 
diplomatic and military agencies’ ability to share data that one may gather 
but others may find useful, the State Department’s action appears to 
demonstrate an adverse effect on WikiLeaks’ disclosures of government 
functions.205 At the same time, however, numerous commentators have 
criticized the lax data-security and security-clearance measures that allegedly 
allowed Manning to copy the data he ultimately released to WikiLeaks.206 
This criticism suggests that a combination of needed technological and 
administrative reforms can more securely and effectively enable information 
sharing than the systems that existed before WikiLeaks—steps that Secretary 
Gates claimed the Department of Defense was taking in response to the 
disclosures and that State Department representatives also claimed to be 
undertaking.207 
 
 203. Kevin Poulsen & Kim Zetter, U.S. Intelligence Analyst Arrested in WikiLeaks Video Probe, 
THREAT LEVEL (June 6, 2010, 9:31 PM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2010/06/leak/. 
 204. Calabresi, supra note 200. 
 205. See, e.g., Beam, supra note 198 (“The scandal will probably have all kinds of chilling 
effects.”); Stewart, supra note 202 (“James Clapper, the director of national intelligence who is 
tasked with promoting greater cooperation within the U.S. intelligence community, hinted last 
month that leaks in Washington were already threatening sharing.”); Straw, supra note 198 
(“Even so, the risk [of leaks] can be mitigated, and that’s likely to mean less sharing, observers 
acknowledge.”); Jaikumar Vijayan, WikiLeaks Incident Shouldn’t Chill Info-Sharing, Ex-CIA Chief 
Says, COMPUTERWORLD (Aug. 4, 2010), http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/9180130/ 
WikiLeaks_incident_shouldn_t_chill_info_sharing_ex_CIA_chief_says (“‘What WikiLeaks did 
was very harmful’ and will likely lead to new dictates on how information is shared.” (quoting 
Robert Rodriguez, former Secret Service agent and founder of the Security Innovation 
Network)). 
 206. See, e.g., Aliya Sternstein, Countering WikiLeaks Could Stifle Information Sharing, NEXTGOV 
(Nov. 29, 2010), http://www.nextgov.com/nextgov/ng_20101129_9475.php; Straw, supra 
note 198; Vijayan, supra note 205. 
 207. See Information Sharing in the Era of WikiLeaks: Balancing Security and Collaboration: 
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs, 112th Cong. (2011) 
(forthcoming) (statement of Patrick F. Kennedy, Under Secretary of State for Management, 
U.S. Department of State), available at http://hsgac.senate.gov/public/index.cfm? 
FuseAction=Hearings.Hearing&Hearing_ID=0c531692-c661-453a-bc97-654be6eb7d00; Terri 
Moon Cronk, DOD Takes Steps To Secure Classified Data, U.S. DEP’T DEF. (Mar. 11, 2011), http:// 
www.defense.gov//News/NewsArticle.aspx?ID=63142; Gates News Briefing, supra note 191. For 
an argument that the information sharing that developed after the post-9/11 reforms was 
ineffective, see AMY B. ZEGART, SPYING BLIND 186–88 (2007). 
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4.  WikiLeaks’ Effects on the American Public 
Arguments about the beneficial effects of transparency begin with the 
assumption that the public will pay attention to, understand, and act or 
threaten to act on the government information they receive.208 When the 
public’s actions and the connection between those actions and disclosed 
information are clear, these effects are easy to identify. In the case of the 
WikiLeaks disclosures, however, even the precise nature of the disclosed 
information—and especially whether the disclosed documents reveal new, 
significant information—is deeply contested. To some American 
commentators, especially those on the left who were critical of the Bush 
administration and have grown increasingly wary of the Obama 
administration, the WikiLeaks disclosures have been exceptionally 
revelatory. In order to support their claim, a number of WikiLeaks advocates 
in late 2010 and early 2011 developed lists of the most important events and 
issues that the disclosures illuminated, lists too long and varied to recount 
here.209 The sheer number and breadth of these disclosures should prove 
WikiLeaks’ value and certain effect. Because these commentators generally 
assume that increased transparency causes or should cause increased public 
knowledge, popular political engagement, and better government, they 
concluded that the scale of the WikiLeaks disclosures and the sheer amount 
of information the disclosures revealed should make it more likely that the 
public will learn, act, and respond.210 If disclosure’s effects are self-evident 
 
 208. See supra text accompanying notes 88–90. 
 209. See, e.g., Glenn Greenwald, What WikiLeaks Revealed to the World in 2010, SALON (Dec. 
24, 2010, 4:25 AM), http://www.salon.com/news/opinion/glenn_greenwald/2010/12/24/ 
wikileaks (providing a list of disclosures and media coverage of them that shows “the breadth of 
the corruption, deceit, brutality and criminality on the part of the world’s most powerful 
factions”); Greg Mitchell, Why WikiLeaks Matters, NATION (Jan. 13, 2011), http:// 
www.thenation.com/article/157729/why-wikileaks-matters (listing eighteen “revelations,” 
concerning events from all over the world); Joshua Norman, How WikiLeaks Enlightened Us in 
2010, CBS NEWS (Dec. 31, 2010), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503543_162-20026591-
503543.html (providing a list of “the more impactful WikiLeaks revelations . . . , grouped by 
region,” that the author describes as having “many major implications for world relations”); 
Rainey Reitman, The Best of Cablegate: Instances Where Public Discourse Benefited from the Leaks, 
ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (Jan. 7, 2011), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2011/01/ 
cablegate-disclosures-have-furthered-investigative (describing in detail five cables that “brought 
much-needed light to government operations and private actions which, while veiled in secrecy, 
profoundly affect the lives of people around the world and can play an important role in a 
democracy that chooses its leaders”). 
 210. See Greenwald, supra note 209 (expressing anger that “many citizens and, especially, 
‘journalists’” responded with anger at WikiLeaks rather than at the culpable government 
officials whose misdeeds the site exposed); Mitchell, supra note 209 (noting the public’s mixed 
response to the WikiLeaks disclosures, based in part on the mainstream media’s 
characterization of them and WikiLeaks); Norman, supra note 209 (praising WikiLeaks and 
recounting its disclosures for teaching the public “about the hidden forces that drive our 
world”); Reitman, supra note 209 (praising WikiLeaks for “hav[ing] contributed significantly to 
public and political conversations all around the world”). 
FENSTER_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/13/2012  1:36 PM 
2012] WIKILEAKS AND TRANSPARENCY 799 
and guaranteed, the very existence of large disclosures of new, important 
information must create beneficial effects. 
For WikiLeaks’ skeptics and critics, however, the disclosures had limited 
informational value. The information WikiLeaks revealed may have 
provided additional details to general information widely known by engaged 
elites,211 such commentators argued, but it did not provide evidence of any 
significant government misconduct or abuses of power.212 Because of the 
likelihood that the disclosures had already, or would certainly, harm foreign 
policy and American interests, WikiLeaks failed the rough, intuitive 
balancing test those critics applied. The disclosures offered only a minimal 
gain in public knowledge, but they posed a significant risk to the state, 
diplomacy, and national security.213 
The opinions of elite commentators who are highly attentive to foreign 
policy, international events, and the current news cycle neither necessarily 
reflect nor shape American public opinion. The general public’s response to 
WikiLeaks is difficult to gauge. But the limited and often flawed findings of 
public-opinion polls provide at least a glimpse of the extent of the public’s 
interest in and understanding of the disclosures. These polls, which have 
trended downward over time, have found that the public is not especially 
interested in WikiLeaks and that a strong majority of the American public 
dislikes it.214 Whereas at least one poll conducted in late July and early 
August 2010 (after the leak of documents from the Afghanistan conflict) 
showed a nearly even split in public opinion about the value of WikiLeaks 
and about the extent of the public’s interest in its disclosure,215 by the end of 
the year (following the diplomatic-cable releases), WikiLeaks’ popularity and 
public interest in the site dropped considerably. Multiple polls taken in 
December 2010 showed strong majorities that both disapproved of the site 
 
 211. See, e.g., Peter Beinart, Why the WikiLeaks Drama Is Overblown, DAILY BEAST (Nov.  
28, 2010, 9:03 PM), http://www.thedailybeast.com/blogs-and-stories/2010-11-29/wikileaks-
diplomatic-document-dump-is-banal-sabotage; Leslie H. Gelb, What the WikiLeaks Documents 
Really Reveal, DAILY BEAST (July 25, 2010, 9:45 PM), http://www.thedailybeast.com/blogs-and-
stories/2010-07-26/wikileaks-what-the-documents-reveal/; Andrew Sullivan, The Starr Report of 
American Foreign Policy?, ATLANTIC (Nov. 29, 2010, 1:57 AM), http://www.theatlantic.com/daily-
dish/archive/2010/11/the-starr-report-of-american-foreign-policy/179234. 
 212. Floyd Abrams, Why WikiLeaks Is Unlike the Pentagon Papers, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 29, 2010), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204527804576044020396601528.html. 
 213. See id.; Beinart, supra note 211; Sullivan, supra note 211. 
 214. The polls have generally not asked about the public’s interest in and knowledge of the 
substance of the disclosures themselves. Instead, the questions are posed in a manner similar to 
much of the public debate surrounding the site—as a meta-conversation about WikiLeaks’ 
significance as an institution and idea. 
 215. Mixed Reactions to Leak of Afghanistan Documents, PEW RES. CTR. FOR THE PEOPLE & THE 
PRESS (Aug. 3, 2010), http://people-press.org/report/641/ (finding 47% of those questioned 
believed that the release of the State Department cables harmed the public interest and 42% 
believed that it served the public interest, while 63% said they had heard a little or nothing at 
all about it). 
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and thought it did more harm than good to the public interest.216 One poll 
that broke down its results by party and ideological affiliation found that 
Democrats and Republicans disapproved of the site in roughly equal 
numbers and that even 64% of self-identified “Liberals” expressed 
disapproval.217 As a possible explanation for this disinterest, the Pew 
Center’s study of news coverage and public interest in the major events and 
issues of 2010 found decreasing interest in and coverage of the wars in 
Afghanistan and Iraq in general.218  
Even conceding the limits of public-opinion polling, it is difficult to 
conclude based on this data that WikiLeaks has made a significant positive 
impact on the general public’s engagement with and knowledge about the 
state and politics.219 If we assume, with WikiLeaks’ proponents, that the site 
has disclosed important and unknown information about outrageous 
American governmental policy and misconduct, and if we assume, with 
transparency proponents and according to WikiLeaks’ reformist theory, that 
information disclosures increase public knowledge and political 
engagement, then one would expect to find widespread discontent 
organized around popular political movements in the U.S. as a result of 
WikiLeaks’ disclosures. But the only insurgent movement in the November 
2010 election cycle was the “Tea Party” faction of the Republican Party, 
which has focused more on the size and cost of government than on the 
 
 216. See, e.g., 60 MINUTES & VANITY FAIR, 60 MINUTES/VANITY FAIR POLL 1 (conducted Dec. 
17–20, 2010), available at http://www.cbsnews.com/htdocs/pdf/february_final_edition.pdf 
(finding that 42% of respondents were not sure what WikiLeaks was, while only 9% considered 
it a “good thing” as opposed to “[d]estructive, but legal” (23%) or “[t]reasonous” (22%)); 
Meredith Chaiken, Poll: Americans Say WikiLeaks Harmed Public Interest; Most Want Assange Arrested, 
WASH. POST (Dec. 14, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/ 
12/14/AR2010121401650.html (discussing poll in which 68% of respondents believed the 
disclosures harmed the public interest and 59% thought Assange should be prosecuted for 
releasing the diplomatic cables); CNN & OP. RESEARCH CORP., CNN/OPINION RESEARCH POLL 2 
(conducted Dec. 17–19, 2010), available at http://i2.cdn.turner.com/cnn/2010/images/ 
12/30/rel17n.pdf (finding that 77% disapproved all of the disclosures and only 20% 
approved); Most Say WikiLeaks Release Harms Public Interest, PEW RES. CTR. FOR THE PEOPLE & THE 
PRESS (Dec. 8, 2010), http://people-press.org/report/682/ (finding that 60% believed the 
release of the State Department cables harmed the public interest); Steven Thomma, Poll: People 
Behind WikiLeaks Should Be Prosecuted, MCCLATCHY (Dec. 10, 2010), http://www.mcclatchydc. 
com/2010/12/10/105106/poll-people-behind-wikileaks-should.html (reporting that 70% of 
respondents thought the leaks had done more harm than good and 59% thought those 
responsible should be prosecuted). 
 217. CNN & OP. RESEARCH CORP., supra note 216, at 3. But see 60 MINUTES & VANITY FAIR, 
supra note 216, at 1 (finding that although more Republicans knew about WikiLeaks than 
Democrats or independents, more of them considered the site “[t]reasonous” and fewer of 
them considered it a “good thing” than Democrats or independents). 
 218. The Year in News 2010: Disaster, Economic Anxiety, but Little Interest in War, 
JOURNALISM.ORG (Jan. 11, 2011), http://www.journalism.org/analysis_report/year_news_2010. 
 219. See Roberts, supra note 12, at 15–19 (arguing that WikiLeaks has had and will have 
little effect on the public). 
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wars in Iraq and Afghanistan or American foreign policy.220 To date, no 
popular political movement of any significant size has formed or been 
energized as a consequence of the disclosures.221 The same assumptions 
about WikiLeaks’ disclosures and their effects would lead one to predict that 
the general public would hold the government accountable for its apparent 
military and diplomatic misdeeds, or at least that the fear of such a response 
would lead the government to respond by changing or reforming its 
unpopular approaches to contested issues. And yet, again, there has been no 
significant or even discernible movement to change existing military 
engagements or foreign policy in the period following the WikiLeaks 
disclosures, except in terms of tightening classified-information controls.222 
The end of the Iraq War in late 2011 appeared unrelated to WikiLeaks’ 
disclosures about American conduct during the war;223 indeed, the troop 
withdrawal was consistent with a pledge President Obama made in February 
 
 220. On the “Tea Party,” see JILL LEPORE, THE WHITES OF THEIR EYES: THE TEA PARTY’S 
REVOLUTION AND THE BATTLE OVER AMERICAN HISTORY (2010); KATE ZERNIKE, BOILING MAD: 
INSIDE TEA PARTY AMERICA (2010). 
 221. To explain the minimal effects from these disclosures, one could claim that the media, 
government, and major corporate interests have actively and apparently successfully worked to 
distract attention from WikiLeaks and to destroy its credibility. See, e.g., Kevin Gosztola, Reflecting 
on the Afghanistan War Logs Released by WikiLeaks One Year Ago, DISSENTER (July 25, 2011,  
11:54 AM), http://dissenter.firedoglake.com/2011/07/25/reflecting-on-the-afghanistan-war-
logs-released-by-wikileaks-one-year-ago (alleging a government–media conspiracy to suppress 
the impact of the disclosures); Glenn Greenwald, The Leaked Campaign To Attack WikiLeaks and 
Its Supporters, SALON (Feb. 11, 2011, 4:12 AM), http://www.salon.com/2011/02/11/ 
campaigns_4/ (identifying “a concerted, unified effort between government and the most 
powerful entities in the private sector” to destroy WikiLeaks and its supporters); Greenwald, 
supra note 69 (criticizing “a major, coordinated effort underway to smear WikiLeaks’ founder, 
Julian Assange, and to malign his mental health—all as a means of distracting attention away 
from these highly disturbing revelations and to impede the ability of WikiLeaks to further 
expose government secrets and wrongdoing with its leaks”). Evaluating this claim is beyond the 
scope of this Article, although the cruel conditions of Bradley Manning’s confinement during 
his pretrial detention (as of March 2011), as well as the disclosure that several private data-
intelligence firms planned technical and public-relations attacks on WikiLeaks and its 
supporters complicate any effort to simply dismiss the claim as a conspiracy theory. See Steve 
Ragan, Data Intelligence Firms Proposed a Systematic Attack Against WikiLeaks, TECH HERALD  
(Feb. 9, 2011), http://www.thetechherald.com/article.php/201106/6798/Data-intelligence-
firms-proposed-a-systematic-attack-against-WikiLeaks; Editorial, The Abuse of Private Manning, 
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 14, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/15/opinion/15tue3.html. 
Yochai Benkler offers a nuanced version of this claim as part of his broader description of the 
incumbent mainstream media’s “battle” against the “networked fourth estate.” See Benkler, 
supra note 12, at 396–97 (criticizing “the ability of private infrastructure companies to restrict 
speech without being bound by the constraints of legality, and the possibility that government 
actors will take advantage of this affordance in an extralegal public–private partnership for 
censorship”). 
 222. See supra Part III.C.1–3. 
 223. See Mark Landler, White House Memo, A Wartime Leader Ends a War He Never Wanted, 
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 8, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/09/world/middleeast/ 
president-obama-ends-a-war-he-never-wanted.html (noting the political and policy-related 
reasons for troop withdrawal). 
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2009, before the WikiLeaks disclosures began.224 President Obama seemed 
not to have changed his policy in either country in response to the 
WikiLeaks disclosures; it was not until June 2011, nearly a year after the 
Afghanistan “War Logs” were released, that he announced a withdrawal of 
troops in response to economic strains and a weakened al Qaeda 
leadership.225 The reformist claims favoring WikiLeaks thus seem 
unpersuasive.226 
Assange’s more radical claims about his site’s revolutionary potential227 
are similarly unpersuasive, at least thus far in the United States. There is no 
evidence of the American state’s inability to function as a direct 
consequence of the WikiLeaks disclosures or from the threat that additional 
websites will adopt the WikiLeaks model. The government’s dislike of 
WikiLeaks and its commitment to shutting it down and punishing its 
principals and collaborators make clear that it perceives the site as a threat. 
Nevertheless, the government’s concern about its loss of control over 
information does not, by itself, suggest that the WikiLeaks disclosures have 
caused or hastened the American state’s imminent collapse. 
5.  WikiLeaks’ International Effects 
While the American public and its relationship with the government 
have not shown much change as a result of WikiLeaks’ major disclosures, 
several autocratic regimes in the Middle East and North Africa have faced 
major popular uprisings, at least one of which arguably was effected by 
several diplomatic cables that WikiLeaks released. Some observers and 
commentators have claimed that WikiLeaks’ disclosures directly affected 
Tunisia, whose president, Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali, fled the country in the 
face of widespread and increasingly violent protests against his corrupt, 
repressive regime.228 The WikiLeaks cables concerning Tunisia revealed 
 
 224. See Peter Baker, With Pledges to Troops and Iraqis, Obama Details Pullout, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 
27, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/28/washington/28troops.html. 
 225. See Mark Landler & Helene Cooper, Obama Will Speed Pullout from War in Afghanistan, 
N.Y. TIMES (June 22, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/23/world/asia/23prexy. 
html?_r=2&pagewanted=all. 
 226. Indeed, to extend the analogy between the Pentagon Papers and WikiLeaks, see supra 
text accompanying notes 65–69, 178–80, some argue that the Pentagon Papers had little direct 
effect on broad public opinion or civilian and military policy regarding the Vietnam War. See, 
e.g., RUDENSTINE, supra note 12, at 329–30; Roberts, supra note 12, at 18–19; Tofel, supra note 
65. Even those who claim that the Pentagon Papers caused or hastened the end of the war 
concede the contested nature of such a claim. See Abrams, supra note 178, at 24. Indeed, Daniel 
Ellsberg himself was reportedly disappointed by the minimal impact the Pentagon Papers had 
on public opinion and on the Nixon administration’s pursuit of the war. See TOM WELLS, WILD 
MAN: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF DANIEL ELLSBERG 340–41, 514 (2001). 
 227. See supra Part II.B. 
 228. Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali Forced To Flee Tunisia as Protesters Claim Victory, GUARDIAN (Jan. 
14, 2011), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/jan/14/tunisian-president-flees-country-
protests. 
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American diplomats’ contempt for Ben Ali’s “system without checks” in a 
government whose kleptomania apparently began with the first family.229 
The Tunisia-related cables were translated and made available to Tunisians 
via locally produced websites.230 According to various reports, the cables’ 
distribution within Tunisia further radicalized an already angry and 
alienated citizenry, helped spur them to increasingly vehement dissent, and 
suggested that the U.S. would not intervene on Ben Ali’s behalf.231 This 
purported effect is a complex one, as the cables themselves revealed nothing 
new to protesters (who were already well aware of their government’s 
corruption), while their influence would be difficult to isolate—indeed, 
their influence is contested by both Tunisians and Americans.232 Rather, the 
cables’ influence may have come from informing Tunisians of others’ 
 
 229. Cable 08TUNIS679, Corruption in Tunisia: What’s Yours Is Mine, WIKILEAKS (Aug. 30, 
2011, 01:44), http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2008/06/08TUNIS679.html. 
 230. Sofiane Ben Haj M’Hamed, How WikiLeaks Rocked Tunisia, INST. WAR & PEACE 
REPORTING (July 6, 2011), http://iwpr.net/report-news/how-wikileaks-rocked-tunisia. One of 
the sites, TUNILEAKS, https://tunileaks.appspot.com/ (last visited Mar. 16, 2011), was 
published by Nawaat.org, a Tunisia-based blog collective that in March 2011 won a Google-
sponsored prize awarded by the group Reporters Without Borders for its WikiLeaks coverage. 
See Matthew Campbell, Tunisian Revolt Bloggers Win Google-Sponsored Web Freedom Prize, 
BLOOMBERG (Mar. 11, 2011, 5:00 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-03-11/ 
tunisian-revolt-bloggers-win-google-sponsored-web-freedom-prize.html. 
 231. See David D. Kirkpatrick, Tunisia Leader Flees and Prime Minister Claims Power, N.Y.  
TIMES (Jan. 14, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/15/world/africa/15tunis.html? 
pagewanted=all (stating that the protesters against Ben Ali “found grist for the complaints in 
leaked cables from the United States Embassy in Tunisia”); David Leigh & Luke Harding, 
WikiLeaks: Tunisia Knew Its Rulers Were Debauched. But Leaks Still Had Impact, GUARDIAN  
(Feb. 2, 2011), http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/2011/feb/02/wikileaks-exclusive-book-
extract (describing a “genuinely extraordinary WikiLeaks effect” in which Tunisians’ respect for 
the U.S. grew because of the cables’ content, and helped give them confidence to oust a 
leader); see also Tom Malinowski, Did WikiLeaks Take Down Tunisia’s Government?, in REVOLUTION 
IN THE ARAB WORLD: TUNISIA, EGYPT, AND THE UNMAKING OF AN ERA 57, 57–58 (Marc Lynch et 
al. eds., 2011) [hereinafter REVOLUTION IN THE ARAB WORLD] (noting that according to 
Tunisian sources, the cables shamed Tunisians, suggested that the U.S. would not protect Ben 
Ali against a popular uprising, and delegitimized Ben Ali and boosted his opponents’ morale); 
Sami Ben Hassine, Tunisia’s Youth Finally Has Revolution on Its Mind, GUARDIAN (Jan. 13,  
2011, 05:00 EST), http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2011/jan/13/tunisia-youth-
revolution (listing WikiLeaks’ revelation of “what everyone was whispering” as one among many 
causes of the uprising). 
 232. See, e.g., Robert Mackey, Qaddafi Sees WikiLeaks Plot in Tunisia, THE LEDE (Jan. 17,  
2011, 12:30 PM), http://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/01/17/qaddafi-sees-wikileaks-plot-
in-tunisia/ (summarizing arguments of those who deny or minimize WikiLeaks’ influence); 
Issandr El Amrani, Twitter, WikiLeaks and Tunisia, ARABIST (Jan. 15, 2011, 1:37 PM), http:// 
www.arabist.net/blog/2011/1/15/twitter-wikileaks-and-tunisia.html (conceding only that 
WikiLeaks “may have played a minor atmospheric r[o]le” in the uprising). It is probably not 
helpful to those arguing in favor of WikiLeaks’ influence that Libyan president Muammar 
Qaddafi, in an effort to avoid Ben Ali’s fate, sought to scapegoat the site as a foreign influence 
in the Tunisian uprising. See Matthew Weaver, Muammar Gaddafi Condemns Tunisia Uprising, 
GUARDIAN (Jan. 16, 2011), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/jan/16/muammar-
gaddafi-condemns-tunisia-uprising. 
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perceptions and knowledge about their corrupt government—information 
that enlightened and further energized protesters about the righteousness 
and likely success of their cause.233 If, as has been widely reported, the 
Tunisian revolt in turn inspired other popular uprisings in the region,234 
and WikiLeaks in fact played some role in inspiring the Tunisian protesters, 
then the disclosures had significant direct and indirect effects (to whatever 
small degree) in setting potentially democratic change in motion.235 
Even if one assumes that these uprisings constitute a positive 
development that is traceable in some material way to WikiLeaks, it is 
unclear how and whether one should factor such an effect into the 
prototypical transparency balancing test. American government-
 
 233. See LEIGH & HARDING, supra note 12, at 247–49. 
 234. See Introduction to Chapter 2 of REVOLUTION IN THE ARAB WORLD, supra note 231, at 41, 
41 (“Tunisia was indeed a model for the region, but only in the sense that its young 
revolutionaries inspired others across the Arab world to launch their own uprisings.”); Hamza 
Hendawi, Egyptians Denounce Mubarak, Clash with Riot Police, ABC NEWS (Jan. 25, 2011), http:// 
abcnews.go.com/International/wirestory?id=12754109 (characterizing Egyptian protests as 
“nationwide demonstrations inspired by Tunisia’s uprising”). 
 235. See LEIGH & HARDING, supra note 12, at 211–12 (arguing that WikiLeaks has produced 
positive democratic externalities throughout the world). Some commentators have identified 
more conventional effects that WikiLeaks could have on democratic elections in Kenya and 
Peru, predicting that the information some released cables contained, along with the opinions 
of the cables’ diplomatic authors, would persuade voters to vote against certain candidates. See 
Juan Arellano, Peru: WikiLeaks and the Presidential Campaign, GLOBAL VOICES (Mar. 5, 2011, 
10:01 PM), http://globalvoicesonline.org/2011/03/05/peru-wikileaks-usa-and-their-effect-on-
the-presidential-campaign/ (Jen Fumero trans.); Murithi Mutiga, Leaked US Cables Likely To 
Shape 2012 Campaigns, DAILY NATION (Mar. 5, 2011), http://www.nation.co.ke/News/politics/ 
Leaked+US+cables+likely+to+shape+2012+campaigns+/-/1064/1119772/-/wedgtu/-/. In addition, 
several days after the beginning of the crisis at several nuclear power reactors in northeastern 
Japan that followed the March 2011 earthquake and tsunami, WikiLeaks released diplomatic 
cables via British newspaper the Telegraph reporting warnings that Japan had received about 
significant safety problems at Japanese reactors, especially in the event of an earthquake.  
See Steven Swinford & Christopher Hope, Japan Earthquake: Japan Warned over Nuclear Plants, 
WikiLeaks Cables Show, TELEGRAPH (Mar. 15, 2011), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/ 
news/worldnews/wikileaks/8384059/Japan-earthquake-Japan-warned-over-nuclear-plants-Wiki 
Leaks-cables-show.html. This kind of disclosure is a classic whistle-blowing act that can allow the 
Japanese public to hold their national government, regulators, and industry actors accountable 
for their actions. Whether they will do so, or whether the disclosures were necessary to stir 
public dissatisfaction, is and will be difficult to prove. But the fact that WikiLeaks could supply 
these cables on a just-in-time basis illustrates the profound nature of the site as a resource for 
the public and as a threat to government secrecy. 
It is important to note, however, that WikiLeaks’ and its supporters’ claims about the site’s 
positive externalities are not uncontested. See, e.g., Dan Murphy, Julian Assange: The Man Who 
Came to Dinner, the Man Who Saved Egypt, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (July 5, 2011), http://www. 
csmonitor.com/World/Backchannels/2011/0705/Julian-Assange-The-man-who-came-to-dinner-
the-man-who-saved-Egypt (strenuously denying Assange’s claims about WikiLeaks’ role in the 
Egyptian uprising); Dan Murphy, Tunisia: That “WikiLeaks Revolution” Meme, CHRISTIAN SCI. 
MONITOR (Jan. 15, 2011), http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Backchannels/2011/0115/ 
Tunisia-That-WikiLeaks-Revolution-meme (questioning claims about WikiLeaks’ role in the 
Tunisian uprisings). 
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information-access law seems to take no consideration of spillover effects 
that take place outside American borders and affect only foreign 
governments.236 Instead, the public interest, as understood and accounted 
for in the prevailing balancing test, implicitly refers to an American public 
interest. The idea that such beneficial effects can occur, however, is inherent 
in the operations and ideals of data networks that recognize no national 
boundaries and can be used to actively resist them, as well as in international 
human-rights law, which recognizes a right to receive information 
“regardless of frontiers.”237 It therefore seems only fair to consider these 
effects in calculating the value of WikiLeaks’ disclosures. This conflict 
constitutes an additional aspect of the WikiLeaks case that confounds 
existing transparency laws and their limited conception of disclosure’s 
effects. The relevant effects for such laws are strictly national in scope and 
jurisdiction and concern the prerogatives and security of the nation-state as 
balanced against the benefits of disclosure to the state’s citizens. 
CONCLUSION: THE CONSEQUENCES OF DISCLOSURE’S UNCERTAIN EFFECTS 
WikiLeaks and its model of massive, vigilante disclosure challenges 
transparency law and theory’s underlying assumption about disclosure’s 
necessary and predictable effects in two ways. First, WikiLeaks’ ability to 
receive and distribute leaked information cheaply, quickly, and seemingly 
unstoppably allows it to bypass the legal framework that would otherwise 
permit courts and officials to consider and balance disclosure’s effects. For 
this reason, WikiLeaks threatens to make transparency’s balance 
irrelevant.238 Second, its recent massive disclosures of U.S. military and 
diplomatic documents, and the uneven and unpredictable effects they have 
had to date, should force us to reconsider and test the assumption that 
disclosure produces effects that can serve as the basis for judicial and 
administrative prediction, calculation, and balancing. For this reason, 
WikiLeaks threatens transparency’s balance by disproving its assumption 
 
 236. Indeed, American intelligence agencies are explicitly barred from disclosing 
documents to foreign governments or their representatives. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3)(E) (2006). 
 237. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/217(III), art. 19 (Dec. 10, 1948), available at http://www.un.org/en/documents/ 
udhr/index.shtml (“Everyone has the right to . . . seek, receive and impart information and 
ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.”). 
 238. I use the term threaten with the caution the term implies. WikiLeaks and its progeny 
may never have as much success again—after all, nearly forty years passed between the 
Pentagon Papers and the major WikiLeaks releases. WikiLeaks’ technological innovations (to 
the extent that there were any) could prove only as successful as the material to which it had 
access, which required the luck and courage (if one sees it as such) of Bradley Manning. To the 
extent that the U.S. government can keep a future Bradley Manning from having access to or 
being able to download such a trove of digital files, WikiLeaks’ “threat” may not be so great. I 
thank Steven Aftergood for this insight. 
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that disclosure guarantees measurable consequences that can be estimated 
ex ante. 
The effects discussed in Part III lend themselves to no simple 
conclusion. Government officials asserted immediately after the massive 
disclosures began that WikiLeaks would cause untold, incalculable damage 
to the nation’s military personnel, national security, and diplomatic efforts. 
Their initial claims would clearly have tipped any balance against disclosure. 
They eventually retreated from that prediction, however, and besides the 
intuitive, subjective, and unprovable claim that disclosure harms internal 
deliberations and international diplomacy, open sources provide no clear 
evidence that WikiLeaks caused significant damage to the Department of 
Defense or the Department of State. The agencies have been forced to revise 
their information-sharing technology and protocols, but the source of the 
WikiLeaks leak seems to demonstrate that their protocols badly needed 
revision—in fact, better to have WikiLeaks do so than to have a terrorist 
group or competing intelligence service obtain this data without the 
government’s knowledge. 
At the same time, it is equally difficult to conclude that the disclosures 
even approach the claims typically made by advocates of transparency’s 
beneficial effects to the nation whose information is disclosed. Neither of 
Julian Assange’s stated goals for WikiLeaks’ vigilante transparency seems to 
have transpired: the United States has neither been reformed by an 
informed and energized public, nor has it collapsed under the weight of an 
insurgent popular movement. WikiLeaks does seem to have affected other 
nations, however, perhaps to some degree inspiring or assisting a popular 
uprising in Tunisia, and in so doing helping to spur broader democratic 
hopes and movements across North Africa and the Middle East. It is too 
soon to tell whether this historical development benefits those nations or the 
United States itself, but it appears at this time that, if true, it is WikiLeaks’ 
most significant effect—an effect that no one could have predicted prior to 
WikiLeaks’ disclosures and one that is not, and perhaps should not be, 
considered within a balancing test that an American administrator or court 
should use. 
The implications of this conclusion are conceptually profound.239 If we 
cannot assume or predict the existence of effects from a massive disclosure 
of classified documents, then a core theoretical concept and assumption for 
the laws governing access to government information are incoherent and 
conceptually bankrupt. Courts can continue to rely upon the idea that they 
are “balancing” various “interests,” but all they do in such instances is make 
 
 239. One implication that lies beyond this Article’s scope is that WikiLeaks illustrates the 
limits of a consequentialist approach to secrecy and transparency. If we cannot predict 
disclosure’s consequences—or even predict whether it will have consequences at all—then a 
consequentialist or utilitarian basis for a legal regime or a legal or political theory will prove 
unsatisfactory, if not wholly inadequate. My thanks to David Pozen for identifying this point. 
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intuitive guesses as to what might happen in the wake of disclosure or its 
absence. In most instances where the state claims that disclosure will cause 
catastrophic consequences, courts will simply defer to the state.240 If courts 
continue to balance interests, they should require more than a worried, 
unsubstantiated prediction—an administrative version of an ipse dixit—
before granting a request for secrecy. A more effective approach would be to 
strengthen and model new entities on permanent or temporary 
administrative bodies that more independently and expertly decide 
consequential claims about disclosure’s dangerous effects—entities such as 
the Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel (“ISCAP”) and the 
9/11 Commission that, though imperfect, have been more effective than 
courts in making difficult decisions about information disclosure.241 If 
disclosure laws must continue to rely upon the nearly impossible task of 
calculating effects, whenever possible they should vest authority to make that 
calculation in officials and institutions that can perform the task more 
competently than judges of general jurisdiction. 
At the same time—contrary to the celebratory rhetoric of some 
transparency advocates—disclosure will not necessarily transform the United 
States or any Western democracy into a model of popular deliberation, 
participatory decision making, and perfect governance.242 In this respect, 
WikiLeaks has proven that Assange’s complication of his theories of 
transparency’s effects was entirely prescient.243 Western governments and 
societies are too complex and decentralized, their publics too dispersed, and 
their information environments too saturated for transparency, by itself, to 
have significant transformative potential. But one can remain committed to 
creating the conditions of a more transparent state and world without simply 
assuming and asserting transparency’s utopian effects. 
 
 240. See Thomas S. Blanton, National Security and Open Government in the United States: Beyond 
the Balancing Test, in NATIONAL SECURITY AND OPEN GOVERNMENT: STRIKING THE RIGHT BALANCE 
33, 66 (Bethany Walawender & Alyssa Colonna eds., 2003), available at http://www.maxwell.syr. 
edu/uploadedFiles/campbell/events/NSOG.pdf (“But we need to drop the idea of balancing 
this fundamental value [of open government] against national security. To admit the notion of 
balancing is to lose the debate over where to balance.”). 
 241. See Aftergood, supra note 156, at 407–09 (discussing ISCAP’s incremental successes); 
Mark Fenster, Designing Transparency: The 9/11 Commission and Institutional Form, 65 WASH. & 
LEE L. REV. 1239, 1313–17 (2008) (discussing the 9/11 Commission’s relatively successful 
efforts to force the Bush administration to disclose information). To clarify what I mean by 
“imperfect” here: while such institutions still perform the nearly impossible task of balancing 
impossibly abstract, conflicting goals, they do so with more expertise, input from more 
experienced officials, and may perform more informal negotiations than Article III courts. 
 242. See Fenster, supra note 133, at 914–36 (describing the failures of open-government 
laws in improving public knowledge and participation). 
 243. See supra text accompanying notes 126–32 (outlining Assange’s argument that Western 
governments are too “fiscalized” to change radically, but suggesting that in states like China, 
where pervasive censorship reigns, radical change can still be achieved). 
